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NOTES

Continuing Criminal Enterprise, Conspiracy, and the Multiple
Punishment Doctrine
Kenneth G. Schuler

In 1970, Congress responded to the near "epidemic" 1 drug problem by enacting the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act. 2 The Act created the crime of engaging in a continuing
criminal enterprise (CCE), 3 an offense designed "to serve as a strong
deterrent to those who otherwise might wish to engage in the illicit
traffic [of narcotics], while also providing a means for keeping those
found guilty of violations out of circulation."4 Congress hoped to
achieve its penal objective by targeting "drug kingpins" and subjecting
offenders to severe mandatory sentences5 without the possibility of parole. 6 The CCE statute requires proof that an individual has committed a series of violations of the narcotics laws7 while organizing or
supervising at least five other people. 8
While several commentators have lamented the impact of the
"War on Drugs" on civil liberties, 9 few have analyzed the relationship
I. H.R. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 6 (1970), reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4572.
2. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-966
(1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
3. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988). The continuing criminal enterprise offense consists of five elements: (1) a felony violation of the narcotics laws, § 848(c)(l); (2) as "part of a continuing series
of violations" of the narcotics laws,§ 848(c)(2); (3) undertaken in concert with five or more other
persons,§ 848(c)(2)(A); (4) "with respect to whom" the defendant is an organizer or supervisor,
§ 848(c)(2)(A); and (5) the defendant obtains substantial income from the activities,
§ 848(c)(2)(B). The third and fourth prongs of the CCE offense therefore require federal prosecutors to establish conspiratorial conduct to obtain a conviction. See generally infra text accompanying notes 167-74.
4. H.R. REP. No. 1444, supra note l, pt. 1, at 10, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4576.
5. 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) provides for a minimum of twenty years imprisonment for CCE offenders. The statute also authorizes a life sentence for engaging in a CCE. 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)-(b)
(1988). A CCE defendant also faces the possibility of fines up to two million dollars. 21 U.S.C.
§ 848(a) (1988). Congress amended the CCE statute in 1988 to allow prosecutors to seek the
death penalty in cases in which a drug lord causes the murder of an individual. 21 U.S.C.
§ 848(e) (1988).
6. 21 U.S.C. § 848(d) prohibits the suspension of sentence for a CCE conviction.
7. 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(l)-(2) (1988).
8. 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2)(A) (1988).
9. See, e.g., Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging ''Drug Exception" to the Bill of
Rights, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 889 (1987); James B. Speta, Note, Narrowing the Scope of Civil Drug
Forfeiture: Section 881, Substantial Connection and the Eighth Amendment, 89 MICH. L. REV.
165 (1990).
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between continuing criminal enterprise convictions, conspiracy convictions, and the Double Jeopardy Clause 10 of the Fifth Amendment. II The potential Double Jeopardy Clause violation arises
because of the Multiple Punishment Doctrine, which mandates that
"no man can be twice lawfully punished for the same offence."I 2
Given that prosecutors have broad discretion in selecting charges, 13
defendants accused of operating a continuing criminal enterprise are
often charged with conspiring to violate the narcotiCs laws as well. 14
Courts then must consider whether convicting and sentencing a defendant for both CCE and conspiracy violates the Multiple Punishment Doctrine. The purposes that the Multiple Punishment Doctrine
serves and the impact that multiple convictions can have upon criminal defendants both highlight the importance of the issue. Unfortunately, the federal courts have not formulated a consistent solution to
the question, leaving the contours of the Multiple Punishment Doctrine in "disarray."I 5 A majority of the circuit courts of appeals hold
that conspiracy is a lesser-included offense within continuing criminal
enterprise and vacate convictions and sentences for conspiracy in order to avoid double punishment. I6 Conversely, four circuits have decided that retaining convictions for both CCE and conspiracy does not
offend the Double Jeopardy Clause, but those circuits disagree as to
how to deal with the convictions and sentences.17
This Note argues that the Multiple Punishment Doctrine prohibits
the imposition of concurrent convictions and sentences upon criminal
defendants found guilty of engaging in a CCE and conspiring to violate narcotics laws. Part I surveys the values underlying the Multiple
Punishment Doctrine and traces the evolution of the Supreme Court's
10. "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy oflife
or limb ...•" U.S. CoNST. amend. V.
11. See generally Phillip H. Cherney, Thrice In Jeopardy: The CCE Prosecution of Felix
Mitchell, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 515 (1987); George C. Thomas III, Sentencing Problems
Under the Multiple Punishment Doctrine, 31 VILL. L. REv. 1351 (1986); Doreen A. Yanik, Recent Case, 21 SETON HALL L. REv. 514 (1991).
12. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 168 (1873). The Multiple Punishment Doctrine
is one of the three double jeopardy protections recognized by the Supreme Court. See infra text
accompanying notes 20-22.
13. The Supreme Court has held that the state may try a defendant for both greater- and
lesser-included offenses, even though the defendant may be sentenced for only one of the crimes.
Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 500 (1984).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Chambers, 944 F.2d 1253, 1256 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1217 (1992); United States v. Medina, 940 F.2d 1247, 1249 (9th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Duke, 940 F.2d 1113, 1115 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. David, 940 F.2d 722, 72627 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2301 (1992); United States v. Paulino, 935 F.2d 739,
745-46 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 315 (1991); United States v. Rivera-Martinez, 931 F.2d
148, 152 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 184 (1991).
15. Fernandez v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 2249 (1991) (White, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
16. See infra note 103.
17. See introduction infra section 11.B.

2222

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 91:2220

application of the doctrine to modern criminal law. Part II examines
the various methods employed by the circuit courts of appeals to deal
with simultaneous convictions and sentences for CCE and conspiracy.
Part III reviews the test, identified in Part I, that the Supreme Court
has implicitly utilized to analyze Multiple Punishment Claims and
evaluates CCE and conspiracy convictions under this standard. This
Note concludes that the majority approach - mandating the vacation
of conspiracy convictions and sentences obtained simultaneously with
a CCE conviction - is the only method utilized by the courts of appeals that comports with the Multiple Punishment Doctrine.

I.

THE GENESIS, EVOLUTION, AND PURPOSES OF THE MULTIPLE
PUNISHMENT DOCTRINE

This Part reviews the historical underpinnings of the Multiple
Punishment Doctrine and the manner in which the Supreme Court
has applied the doctrine to modern criminal law, including continuing
criminal enterprise prosecutions. Section I.A examines the origin of
the multiple punishment bar and surveys the doctrine's constitutional
functions, focusing on protection it provides against adverse collateral
consequences. Section l.B describes the Supreme Court's test for analyzing disputes involving the potential for double punishment in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Section I.C reviews the Court's
interpretation of the doctrine in cases involving CCE convictions and
concludes that the Supreme Court has not formulated a coherent body
of precedent for evaluating multiple punishment claims in the CCE
conspiracy context.
A.

The Purposes of the Multiple Punishment Doctrine

The notion that no person should be subject to criminal prosecution or punishment twice for the same offense is perhaps the oldest18
and most widely recognized 19 guarantee in the Bill of Rights. The
18. See 1 DEMOSTHENES 589 (J.H. Vince trans., 1970), quoted in Whalen v. United States,
445 U.S. 684, 699 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[T]he laws forbid the same man to be tried
twice on the same issue ... .");see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES •335 ("[It is
a] universal maxim of the common law of England that no man is to be brought into jeopardy of
his life more than once for the same offense."); 3 EDWARD COKE, INSrITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 213 (London 5th ed. 1797) (1628) (prior acquittal "of the same felony" precludes a
second trial); 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN ch. 36, § 10, at
377 (London 4th ed. 1762) (1716-1721) ("the Party ought not to be brought twice into Danger of
his Life for the same Crime").
The Multiple Punishment Doctrine apparently originated out of the plea of autrefoits convict,
which prevented a person previously convicted and sentenced for an offense from being tried for
the same crime. See 2 MATTHEW HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 251 (1778).
19. Both the ancient Greeks and the English common law prohibited double jeopardy. See
supra note 18. The notion has also been recognized in a number of other Western legal systems,
including Roman and canon law. See JAY A. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL POLICY 1-3 (1969). Jewish law also contained a prohibition on
the multiplication of punishments. See GEORGE HOROWITZ, THE SPIRIT OF JEWISH LAW 170
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Supreme Court describes double jeopardy as encompassing three separate protections: protection against retrial following acquittal, protection against retrial following conviction, and protection against
multiple punishments for the same offense. 20 The Court long ago recognized that the third protection - "that no man can be twice lawfully punished for the same offence" 21 - was "clearly [contained
within] the spirit of the [Fifth Amendment]."22
The seminal case regarding multiple punishment, Ex parte
Lange, 23 involved a claim of excessive punishment raised by a defendant sentenced to both imprisonment and a fine, even though the applicable statute authorized only one of the punishments. 24 The Court,
after surveying the common law,. reasoned that the protection against
multiple punishments forms the core of the Double Jeopardy Clause:
For of what avail is the constitutional protection against more than one
trial if there can be any number of sentences pronounced on the same
verdict? Why is it that, having once been tried and found guilty, [a person] can never be tried again for that offence? Manifestly it is not the
danger or jeopardy of being a second time found guilty. It is the punishment that would legally follow the second conviction which is the real danger guarded against by the Constitution. 25

The Court ordered Lange's release because he had fully satisfied one of
(1953) ("for one offense, only one punishment might be inflicted"). Today, the right of a criminal defendant not to be subjected to punishment more than once for a crime is well recognized in
industrialized societies. See generally SIGLER, supra, at 118-54.
20. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989) (citing North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)).
21. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 168 (1873).
22. Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 170.
23. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
24. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 175.
25. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 173 (emphasis added). Several commentators have argued that the
Framers of the Constitution viewed the protection against multiple punishments as the preeminent aspect of the Double Jeopardy Clause. See, e.g., Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262,
266 n.13 (1965). The argument stems from Madison's initial wording of the Clause, which provided that "[n]o person shall be subject •.. to more than one punishment or one trial for the
same offence." l ANNALS OF CONG. 451-52 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
This argument presumes that, although the wording of the Clause was altered, the meaning
assigned to the Clause was not. The limited record surrounding the change in wording does not
provide any definitive reason to accept or reject this notion. Representative Benson moved to
amend the original wording of the Clause to ensure habeas corpus relief, arguing that the prohibition on multiple trials would prevent persons convicted unfairly from obtaining a second trial.
In his estimation, "[t]he humane intention of the clause was to prevent more than one punishment." Id. at 782. The amendment was defeated by a large margin, however. Id. Representative Lawrence subsequently introduced a motion to limit the right against self-incrimination to
criminal trials, which was adopted. Id. Representative Lawrence's refined wording apparently
altered the phrasing of the Double Jeopardy Clause as well.
The Supreme Court has apparently accepted this reading of the Double Jeopardy Clause's
historical significance. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989) (noting that "[i]n
drafting his initial version of what came to be our Double Jeopardy Clause, James Madison
focused explicitly on the issue of multiple punishment").
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the alternative statutory penalties. 26 In so doing, the Court recognized
the Multiple Punishment Doctrine as an essential foundation of the
Constitution's bulwark protecting criminal defendants from double
jeopardy.
The judiciary has not interpreted the prohibition on multiple punishments consistently, however. One commentator astutely suggests
that judges have conducted Double Jeopardy Clause inquiries without
reference to the justifications which should inform a court's decisionmaking. 27 Such lackadaisical jurisprudence may explain why thenJustice Rehnquist noted that double jeopardy doctrine was mired in
"confusion."28 Yet, the purposes underlying a rule of law may ultimately be the most important guide in conducting the judicial inquiry
in an individual case. 29 Hence, an inquiry into the constitutionality of
imposing convictions and sentences for both CCE and conspiracy
ought to begin with the purposes underlying the Multiple Punishment
Doctrine. Using these goals to analyze multiple punishment claims
should yield a better decisionmaking process and a presumptively superior result.
The Multiple Punishment Doctrine serves three constitutional
objectives. Initially, the doctrine limits the state's discretion to subject
a citizen to punishment exceeding that condoned by the legislature by
acting through the office of the prosecutor. 30 Indeed, the doctrine's
significance has become more pronounced as the proliferation of statutory offenses has greatly increased the prosecutor's power over a criminal defendant. 31 This imbalance of power may manifest itself in
26. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 175.
27. Note, supra note 25, at 266 ("We are rarely told why it is wrong to retry for the same
crime or punish twice.... The judiciary is content to apply the double jeopardy prohibition with
only a reverent nod to its policies."); see also United States v. Maza, 983 F.2d 1004, 1010 (11th
Cir. 1993) ("Unfortunately, case law interpreting the Double Jeopardy Clause is often applied
without regard to the context in which it arose .... The rather indiscriminate application of the
rules from one context into another puts at risk many of the interests the Double Jeopardy
Clause is intended to protect .•.. ").
28. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 699 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
29. See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112 (1921)
("Which of these forces shall dominate in any case must depend largely upon the comparative
importance or value of the social interests that will be thereby promoted or impaired."); O.W.
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897) ("Still it is true that a body of
law is more rational and more civilized when every rule it contains is referred articulately and
definitively to an end which it subserves, and when the grounds for desiring that end are stated or
are ready to be stated in words.").
30. See, e.g., SIGLER, supra note 19, at 182-87; Cherney, supra note 11, at 519-20; Note,
supra note 25, at 304-06. The Supreme Court has emphasized that the Double Jeopardy Clause
generally limits the power of prosecutors to obtain punishment in excess of that authorized by
the legislature. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977).
31. See SIGLER, supra note 19, at 156 ("[A]n increasing number of criminal statutes have
been created, a development which has weakened the significance of double jeopardy as it has
increased the power of the prosecutor."); Note, supra note 25, at 304. The prosecutor's advantage may be even greater when conspiracy charges are brought in addition to substantive offenses, as in the context of a CCE prosecution. SIGLER, supra note 19, at 171-72 ("Federal

August 1993]

Note-Multiple Punishment Doctrine

2225

several ways. The profusion of statutory crimes allows the prosecutor
to choose a punishment and select a crime to fit that punishment. 32 A
prosecutor might also threaten to seek convictions under a variety of
overlapping statutes to coerce a defendant into accepting a plea bargain. 33 Finally, the ability to prosecute a defendant for several statutory offenses increases the probability that the prosecutor will obtain a
conviction on at least one of the charges. 34
The importance of protection from arbitrary and oppressive
prosecutorial conduct should be readily apparent: "Double jeopardy
was designed to thwart government tyranny. A disgruntled prosecutor or an inflamed democracy can be just as tyrannical as a monarch."35 Judicial enforcement of the Multiple Punishment Doctrine
blunts the ability of a prosecutor to utilize such discretion against a
defendant. 36
The Multiple Punishment Doctrine concomitantly reinforces the
constitutionally mandated demarcation of powers between the three
branches of government. 37 A court can punish a defendant under
multiple statutory provisions only if the legislature has authorized
punishment under two or more statutes. 38 This rule reflects the legislature's exclusive authority to define criminal behavior and to establish
appropriate punishments. 39 As the Supreme Court has noted, "[i]f a
attorneys have been most adept in the use of of conspiracy charges to secure more ease in utilizing evidence, to avoid the statute of limitations, to obtain more and easier double convictions,
and to bolster their personal reputation for diligence.").
32. Note, supra note 25, at 304-05.
33. Id. at 305 ("Given the choice of contesting guilt and risking crushing sentence, or pleading guilty to one of the offenses, an uncertain defendant may well capitulate.").
34. See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 372 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[W]here the
prosecution's evidence is weak, its ability to bring multiple charges may substantially enhance the
possibility that, even though innocent, the defendant may be found guilty on one or more charges
as a result of a compromise verdict."); see also Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 867 (1985)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that prosecutorial tactic of bringing multiple charges tends to
"tilt the scales of justice against the defendant"). This type of state conduct has been approved
by the Court, however. See supra note 13.
35. Note, supra note 25, at 292.
36. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 (1977) ("The Double Jeopardy Clause is not such a
fragile guarantee that prosecutors can avoid its limitations by the simple expedient of dividing a
single crime into a series of temporal or spatiiµ units.").
37. See, e.g., Michael P. Doss, Comment, Resentencing Defendants and the Protection
Against Multiple Punishment, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 1409, 1419 (1985) ("[T]he multiple punishment bar act[s] as a restriction upon judicial power.").
38. See infra text accompanying notes 74-78. Indeed, the Supreme Court has suggested that
"the role of the constitutional guarantee [against double jeopardy] is limited to assuring that the
court does not exceed its legislative authorization." Brown, 432 U.S. at 165 (emphasis added);
see also Hunter, 459 U.S. at 366 ("[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the
sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended.") (emphasis
added). For a criticism of this approach, see infra note 75.
39. See, e.g., Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368 ("Legislatures, not courts, prescribe the scope of punishments."). Peter Westen and Richard Drube! suggest that double jeopardy also constrains the
legislature's power to fashion penalties. They argue that "the Double Jeopardy Clause acts as an
indirect restraint on the legislature, because it demands a certain standard of clarity from the
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federal court exceeds its own authority by imposing multiple punishments not authorized by Congress, it violates . . . the constitutional
principle of separation of powers. " 40
The importance of maintaining strict boundaries between the powers of the three branches of government in our democracy is undisputed. 41 Violation of the separation of powers in the criminal justice
context uniquely corrodes our system of republican government, 42 for
the division of power between the legislature and the judiciary in the
area of criminal law is indispensable to democratic governance. 43
Moreover, a judge's ability to cumulate punishments for overlapping
offenses represents "[b]y its nature ... an arbitrary power."44 While
guidelines afford judges latitude to determine individual sentences, the
number of statutes violated by a single act of the defendant simply "is
not relevant" to that determination. 45
Finally, the Multiple Punishment Doctrine provides a measure of
finality for the criminal defendant. The prohibition on multiple punishments minimizes the defendant's "anxiety and insecurity"46 regarding the sentencing process.47 Once a defendant has "fully suffered ...
[the] punishment[] to which alone the law subjected him," 48 the imposition of further sanctions offends universal notions of fairness. 49 The
legislature before multiple punishment will be allowed." Peter Westen & Richard Drube!, To·
ward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 SUP. Cr. REv. 81, 118.
40. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 689 (1980); see also Brown, 432 U.S. at 165
("once the legislature has acted courts may not impose more than one punishment for the same
offense"); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 178 (1873) (after sentencing a defendant to the
maximum penalty for an offense, "[the court's] authority was ended").
41. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697-99 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); THE
FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison).
42. See Whalen, 445 U.S. at 689 (judicial overreaching in the sentencing context "trenches
particularly harshly on individual liberty").
43. See, e.g., CHARLES DE SECONDAT MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 152
(Thomas Nugent trans., 1966) ("Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not sepa·
rated from the legislative • . • • Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the
subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would be then the legislator.").
44. Note, supra note 25, at 306.
45. Id. at 307; cf. UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4Al.2(a)(2)
(1990) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.] (concurrent sentences are not aggregated for the purpose of estab·
lishing a defendant's criminal history points).
46. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
47. See United States v. McHan, 966 F.2d 134, 139 (4th Cir. 1992) ("The Double Jeopardy
Clause imposes a rule of finality for criminal law judgments to protect persons from the burden,
expense, embarrassment, and harassment of multiple prosecutions and punishments for the same
offense."); cf. Doss, supra note 37, at 1419-20 (arguing that double jeopardy protects a defend·
ant's interest in finality and therefore precludes resentencing on counts remaining after reversal
of the primary convictions).
48. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 176 (1873).
49. Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 178 (excess punishment is forbidden "by the dearest principles of personal rights"); see also United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447 (1989) (describing
"the 'humane interests' safeguarded by the Double Jeopardy Clause's proscription of multiple
punishments" and declaring that "[the] constitutional protection [against multiple punishments]
is intrinsically personal.").
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Multiple Punishment Doctrine guarantees a defendant that satisfaction of the legislatively authorized sentence will terminate the punishment imposed by society. In Ball v. United States, 50 the Court
recognized the potential for "adverse collateral consequences" 51 when
a defendant is convicted of multiple, overlapping offenses. Criminal
convictions are often used to deny parole, to impeach a witness' testimony, and to enhance sentences under recidivist statutes. Convictions
for lesser-included offenses may therefore result in adverse consequences in subsequent criminal proceedings. Ball construed the Multiple Punishment Doctrine to limit the legal effects of a single act in
future legal proceedings, reinforcing finality in the criminal justice
system.
The Supreme Court has identified four adverse consequences that
might fl.ow from the retention of unconstitutional convictions upon a
defendant's record: the social stigma resulting from a felony conviction, ineligibility for parole, impeachment of character in future legal
proceedings, and increased sentences under recidivist statutes. 52 The
effect of additional convictions on a person's reputation cannot be
quantified, yet the Constitution creates a presumption that the incremental degradation associated with each conviction constitutes punishment. 53 This consequence alone might justify the conclusion that
the retention of conspiracy convictions in addition to a CCE conviction is constitutionally suspect. The reduced possibility for parole,
however, is irrelevant in this context because the CCE statute forbids
the suspension of a sentence imposed for the offense. 54
Three adverse consequences may fl.ow from allowing convictions
for conspiracy to coexist with a CCE conviction. First, the multiplication of convictions increases the defendant's susceptibility to impeachment in subsequent legal proceedings. Evidence of prior felony
convictions is admissible to impeach a witness at trial. 55 The retention
50. 470 U.S. 856 (1985).
51. 470 U.S. at 865.
52. 470 U.S. at 865; see also Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 579 n.3 (1969); Sibron v. New
York, 392 U.S. 40, 55-56 (1968); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1968).
53. See Sibron 392 U.S. at 40:
It is impossible for this Court to say at what point the number of convictions on a man's
record renders his reputation irredeemable. And even if we believed that an individual had
reached that point, it would be impossil1le for us to say that he had no interest in beginning
the process of redemption with the particular case sought to be adjudicated.
392 U.S. at 56 (footnote omitted).
54. 21 u.s.c. § 848(d) (1988).
55. See FED. R. Evm. 609. Most states have similar rules governing the admissibility of
evidence establishing past criminal wrongdoing. See, e.g., McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 43, at
93-95 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984). The federal rule does contain a potential safeguard
against the utilization of convictions for conspiracy, however. The Federal Rules of Evidence
allow the prosecution to offer proof of past convictions provided that "the court determines that
the probative value of admitting [the] evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant."
FED. R. Evm. 609(a). This requirement, however, hardly inspires enough confidence to enable
one to presume that there is no danger of collateral punishment.
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of convictions for both the greater and lesser offenses increases the
chance that an adverse party can successfully impeach the credibility
of the former prisoner, as the sheer number of convictions may unduly
influence a jury. "Although [the defendant] could explain that [the]
convictions arose out of the same transaction, a jury might not be able
to appreciate this subtlety."56 The credibility of a previously convicted felon might then play a pivotal role in deciding that person's
fate in a subsequent criminal proceeding. 57
The potential sentencing of a defendant as a recidivist presents additional adverse collateral consequences in the CCE context.
Although the federal sentencing guidelines count only those convictions arising from separate transactions in calculating a defendant's
criminal history score, 58 many states have enacted less sophisticated
recidivist sentencing statutes. Such statutes merely count the number
of convictions on a defendant's record, regardless of the circumstances
under which those convictions were obtained. 5 9 A convicted CCE
56. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 791 (1969).
57. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 720 F.2d 519, 522 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 1310 (1984) (defendant convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine; admission .of evidence
of prior convictions upheld "in view of the importance of Johnson's credibility"); United States
v. Young, 702 F.2d 133, 137 (8th Cir. 1983) (defendant convicted of assault; admission of prior
conviction upheld because "[c]redibility was extremely important in this case").
58. U.S.S.G., supra note 45, § 4Al.2 application note 3 (1990) ("Cases are considered related
if they (1) occurred on a single occasion, (2) were part of a single common scheme or plan, or (3)
were consolidated for trial or sentencing."). The Sentencing Manual does invite judges to depart
from the guidelines in the event that the exclusion of related convictions "underrepresents the
seriousness of the defendant's criminal history and the danger that he presents to the public." Id.
Hence, the possibility exists that the retention of lesser-included offenses will generate adverse
collateral consequences in the Federal penal system.
59. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-9 (1975) (distinguishing between two and three prior convictions);
ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125 (1962 & Supp. 1992) (distinguishing between two and three prior
convictions); ARK. CoDE ANN. § 5-4-501 (Michie 1987) (distinguishing between four or fewer
felony convictions); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4214 (1987 & Supp. 1992) (distinguishing between two and three prior convictions); FLA. STAT. ch. 775.084 (1991); HAW. REV. STAT.§ 706606.5 (Supp. 1992) (distinguishing between two and three prior convictions); IDAHO CODE§ 192514 (1987); IOWA CODE§ 902.8 (1983); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 21-4504 (1988); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN.§ 529.1 (West 1992) (distinguishing between two, three, and four prior convictions); MICH.
CoMP. LAWS ANN.§§ 769.11, 769.12 (West Supp. 1991) (distinguishing between two and three
prior convictions); NEV. REv. STAT. § 207.010 (1991) (distinguishing between two and three
prior convictions); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-09(1) (Supp. 1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2929.01 (Baldwin 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-35-106 to -108 (1990) (distinguishing four
or more prior convictions); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 11 (1974); WASH. REV. CODE§ 9.92.090
(West 1988); W. VA. CODE§ 61-11-18 (1992).
Three states require that a sentence have been imposed on the conviction in order for it to be
counted under the recidivist sentencing statute. See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 279, § 25 (1990); NED.
REV. STAT. § 29-2221 (1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-1001 (Supp. 1992). Collateral consequences would flow from the imposition of concurrent sentences for conspiracy convictions in
these states, rendering suspect the Seventh Circuit's assertion that such sentences entail "no risk
of collateral consequences." United States v. Bond, 847 F.2d 1233, 1239 (7th Cir. 1988).
Most jurisdictions follow the federal scheme and require that convictions arise out of separate
transactions to count against the defendant under the recidivist sentencing scheme. ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN.§ 13-604(H) (1989); CAL. PENAL CODE§ 667(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1991); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 16-13-101(1)-(2) (1986); CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-40(d) (1983); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 22-104a(b)(2) (1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-7(c) (1990); ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 38,
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felon may confront the prospect of sentencing in a state with such a
crude criminal conviction accounting system. 60 "[T]his possibility ...
[although] remote," 61 clearly magnifies the defendant's punishment
when lesser-included convictions are retained. 6 2
Finally, simultaneous convictions for CCE and conspiracy may
subject a defendant to lengthy pretrial detention if the defendant is
later arrested on unrelated charges. The government can detain persons arrested in the federal system until trial based in part on their
"criminal history." 63 A majority of states have similar provisions. 64
para. 33B-l(c) (1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8(b) (Supp. 1979); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 532.080(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.152(c) (West Supp. 1991);
Miss. CoDE ANN. § 99-19-81 (Supp. 1992); Mo. REv. STAT. § 558.016(3) (Supp. 1992); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-18-501 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:6(1)(c) (1988); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C44-3(a) (West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 31-18-17 (Michie Supp. 1992); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 70.lO(c) (McKinney 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-7.1 (1986); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 12.1-3209(1)(c) (Supp. 1991); OKLA. STAT. TIT. 21, § 51(B) (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-21(A)
(Supp. 1992); s.c. CoDE ANN.§ 17-25-50 (Law. Co-op 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.§ 227-9 (1988); Tux. PENAL CODE ANN.§ 12.42 (West Supp. 1990); WYO. STAT.§ 6-10-201 (1988).
Five states have enacted habitual offender laws that require only that a person have been
convicted of one previous felony. In these states, the retention of convictions on the lesser-included conspiracy counts would not affect the flow of collateral consequences because the CCE
conviction would suffice to justify the additional incarceration authorized by the statute. ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 757 (West Supp. 1992); Mo. CRIM. LAW CooE ANN.§ 643B (1988);
OR. REV. STAT. § 161.725(2) (1991); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9714(a) (1982); WIS. STAT.
§ 939.62(2) (1989-1990).
Virginia has not enacted a recidivist sentencing statute.
60. A previously convicted felon would encounter the prospect of adverse consequences
under two types of habitual offender sentencing plans. In the states that simply require conviction of a person for a minimum number of offenses to be considered a recidivist, a single criminal
scheme could qualify the person as a habitual felon, regardless of the fact that the convictions
stemmed from the "same transaction." In those states that adjust the severity of the sentence
handed out to habitual felons, multiple conspiracy convictions arising out of one criminal enterprise may well qualify a defendant under the most serious offender status, earning the defendant
a term of life imprisonment. See supra note 59.
61. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 790-91 (1969).
62. Benton, 395 U.S. at 790-91.
63. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3)(A) (1988).
64. See generally JOHN s. GOLDKAMP, Two CLASSES OF ACCUSED: A STUDY OF BAIL AND
DETENTION IN AMERICA 67 (1979) ("Prior criminal record is specified [as a criteria for witholding bail] in the guidelines of thirty-six states."); id. at 60 ("Overall, the right to bail described in
state guidelines appears to be defined principally in terms of seriousness of the offense charged,
possible penalty, and record of prior convictions.").
Several states permit pretrial detention based in part on an accused's record of convictions.
See CAL. PENAL CODE§ 1275 (West Supp. 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-4-lOl(b)(Ill) (Supp.
1992); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 110-6.l(d)(2)(A) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); MASS. GEN. L.
ch. 276, § 58 (1990); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. L. §§ 510.10-.30 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1993).
Most states look at prior convictions to determine the conditions to be imposed pursuant to
pretrial release. See ALA. R. CRIM. PROC. 7.2(a) (1992); ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.020(c)(8)
(1990); ARK. R. CRIM. PROC. 8.5(b)(vii) (Michie 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2105 (1987);
D.C. CODE ANN.§ 23-1321(b) (1989); FLA. STAT. ch. 903.046(2) (1991); IDAHO CRIM. R. 46(a)
(1992); IOWA CODE§ 811.2(2) (1983); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 22-2802(4) (1988); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 1026(4) (West Supp. 1992); Mo. CODE ANN., Ct. R. 4-216(1) (1993); MINN. R.
CRIM. PROC. 6.02(2) (West 1993); Mo. REV. STAT. § 544.455(2) (1986); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 46-9-301, -501 (1985); NEB. REV. STAT.§ 29-901.01 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 178.4851,
.4853 (1991); N.J. R. CRIM. PRAC. 326-4 Cmt. (West 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15a-534(c)
(1988); N.D. R. CRIM. PROC. 46(a)(l)(ii) (1992-1993); Omo R. CRIM. PROC. 46(F) (Baldwin
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The government may use multiple convictions for the same conduct to
justify the lengthy incarceration of a defendant awaiting trial, a situation implicating "the individual's strong interest in liberty." 65 Hence,
the retention of convictions for conspiracy, obtained simultaneously
with a CCE conviction, potentially implicates the finality interest safeguarded by the Multiple Punishment Doctrine. 66
The Multiple Punishment Doctrine affords criminal defendants
protection against prosecutorial overreaching, undergirds the separation of legislative and judicial power, and promotes finality in criminal
punishment. While it is easy to identify the protection offered by the
doctrine, the procedure for evaluating cumulative punishment claims
is not. The next section analyzes the Supreme Court's multiple punishment jurisprudence to isolate the test for scrutinizing complaints of
excessive punishment.
B. Analyzing Multiple Punishment Claims

Although one commentator describes double jeopardy doctrine as
a "Gordian knot," 67 a careful reading of the Supreme Court's pronouncements on the multiple punishment bar reveals a vague but useful strand of analysis for evaluating double punishment claims. 68 A
1992); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 135.230-.265 (1991); PA. R. CRIM. PROC. 4004 (1992); R.I. GEN.
LAWS§ 12-13-1.3(b) (Supp. 1992); s.c. CODE ANN.§ 17-15-30 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 23A-43-4 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-118(b) (1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
13, § 7554(b) (Supp. 1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-123(A) (Michie Supp. 1992); Wis. STAT.
§ 9.69.01(4) (1989-1990). Texas common law allows similar results based in part on previous
convictions. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 829 S.W.2d 885, 887 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992). Some states
permit the amount of bail to reflect the defendant's prior convictions. See IND. CODE ANN. § 3533-8-4(b) (West 1986); KY. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 431.525(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985); LA.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 317 (West Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE§ 62-lC-3 (1992). The
greater the number of convictions on a defendant's record, the more likely that the conditions
accompanying release will be onerous - that is, heavily supervised release, release into custody,
or extremely high bail. See GOLDKAMP, supra, at 67-68 (describing how states use defendants'
prior criminal record to set high bail).
65. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987). Others describe the deprivation of
liberty accompanying pretrial detention and bail differently. See, e.g., ROY B. FLEMMING, PUNISHMENT BEFORE TRIAL 2 (1982) ("Punishment before trial, then, shares the same features as
sentencing following conviction. Defendants lose their liberty, spend time in jail, and incur financial penalties."); Louis M. Natali, Jr. & Edward D. Ohlbaum, Redrafting the Due Process Model:
The Preventive Detention Blueprint, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 1225, 1260 (1989) (lamenting "the right
snatched away by the Court in Salerno" as a possible "harbinger of the future emasculation of
civil liberty").
66. Retention of conspiracy convictions offends the doctrine only if conspiracy is a lcsserincluded offense within CCE and Congress did'not intend to punish the offenses cumulatively.
These subjects are discussed in Part III, infra.
67. George C. Thomas, Multiple Punishments for the Same Offense: The Analysis After Missouri v. Hunter or Don Quixote, the Sargasso Sea, and the Gordian Knot, 62 WASH. U. L.Q. 79,
79 & n.* (quoting Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 702 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting))
(1984).
68. See Julie R. Niemeyer, Casenote, The Multiple Punishment Protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause: Thomas v. Morris, 22 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1081, 1100-01 (1989) (describing a
two-part inquiry into multiple punishment claims).
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court facing an excessive punishment claim must initially decide
whether the crimes constitute identical offenses. If the offenses overlap for double jeopardy purposes, courts may still impose punishment
on each count if the legislature has authorized them to do so. Absent
a clear expression of the legislature's will, the Constitution requires the
court to vacate convictions for lesser-included offenses to avoid cumulative punishment. 69
The Supreme Court announced the first step in conducting a multiple punishment analysis - discerning whether two crimes constitute
the "same offense" - in Blockburger v. United States. 70 In deciding
whether statutory offenses overlap, "the test to be applied . . . is
whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does
not." 71 Courts functionally conduct the analysis in terms of greater
and lesser offenses. For example, the Court has noted that in order to
convict a defendant of auto theft, a state must establish the lesser offense of joyriding, because all the elements of joyriding are also elements oftheft.72 In such a situation, "[t]he greater offense is therefore
by definition the 'same' for purposes of double jeopardy as any lesser
offense included in it." 73 No multiple punishment occurs if a court
finds that two offenses are distinct.
A conclusion that two charges overlap and therefore place a defendant in jeopardy of being convicted for a greater and lesser offense,
however, does not end the inquiry. If "Congress intended ... to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution." 74 The rule of statutory construction outlined in
Blockburger does not control when the legislature reveals its intent to
punish cumulatively.75 An excessive punishment claim obviously
69. See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864-65 (1985).
70. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
71. 284 U.S. at 304;see also Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 517 n.8 (1990) ("Blockburger [is]
a test to determine the permissibility of cumulative punishments.").
72. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 167-68 (1977).
73. Brown, 432 U.S. at 168.
74. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 (1981).
75. E.g., Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1982) (if "a legislature specifically authorizes cumulative punishment ... a court's task of statutory construction is at an end"); Albernaz,
450 U.S. at 340. Some commentators criticize the Court's willingness to defer to the legislative
branch. They argue that the Court has undermined the substantive protection of the Double
Jeopardy Clause by defining its scope in terms of legislative formality. See Hunter, 459 U.S. at
370-74 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("If the Double Jeopardy Clause imposed no restrictions on a
legislature's power to authorize multiple punishment, there would be no limit to the number of
convictions a State could obtain on the basis of the same act ...."); Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 333
(Stewart, J., concurring) ("No matter how clearly it spoke, Congress could not constitutionally
provide for cumulative punishments unless each statutory offense required proof of a fact that the
other did not .•.•");Westen & Drube!, supra note 39, at 113 (the view "that the Double Jeopardy Clause imposes no restrictions whatsoever on the legislature's definition of offenses ...
contradicts a handful of decisions"); Doss, supra note 37, at 1421 ("[T)he multiple punishment
bar would be rendered meaningless by a reading that it protects only against the imposition of
sentences in excess of legislated limits.").
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"cannot be resolved without determining what punishments the Legislative Branch has authorized."76 If the relevant legislative history
reveals an intent to authorize punishment under two overlapping statutes, a court should defer to the legislative will and impose a sentence
for each violation.11 If, however, an analysis of legislative intent fails
to yield a definitive result, a court should vacate the convictions on the
lesser counts to avoid adverse collateral consequences and the prospect
of multiple punishment. 7 s
The Supreme Court has formulated, albeit not explicitly acknowledged, this two-step inquiry for cumulative punishment claims. As
the next section demonstrates, the Court has largely followed this jurisprudence in cumulative punishment cases challenging convictions
and sentences under the CCE statute.
C. Supreme Court Treatment of CCE and Double Jeopardy

The Supreme Court has examined the interaction between the continuing criminal enterprise statute and the Double Jeopardy Clause on
two occasions. In Jeffers v. United States, 19 the Court questioned
whether the government may punish an individual for both CCE and
conspiracy to violate narcotics laws under 21 U.S.C. § 846. 80 The
government initially indicted Garland Jeffers for conspiring to distribute cocaine and heroin, and it later indicted him for engaging in a
continuing criminal enterprise. 81 Jeffers resisted the government's motion to consolidate the two trials, arguing that the proceedings would
prejudice him since the indictments involved different groups of codefendants. 82 The district court denied the government's motion and
conducted separate trials. 83 Jeffers was found guilty at both trials.
Jeffers appealed, claiming that his conspiracy conviction precluded a
subsequent conviction for CCE. Jeffers predicated his argument on
the notion that conspiracy is a lesser-included offense within CCE. 84
The Court held that the subsequent prosecution did not offend the
Double Jeopardy Clause because Jeffers had prevented a consolidated
76. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 688 (1980); see also A/bernaz, 450 U.S. at 332
("[T]he question of what punishments are constitutionally permissible is not different from the
question of what punishments the Legislative Branch intended to be imposed.").
77. See Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368; Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 343.
78. See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864 (1985) ("[T]he only remedy consistent with
the congressional intent is for the District Court . . . to vacate one of the underlying
convictions.").
79. 432 U.S. 137 (1977) (plurality opinion).
80. 432 U.S. at 146-47.
81. 432 U.S. at 140-141.
82. 432 U.S. at 142-43.
83. 432 U.S. at 143.
84. 432 U.S. at 144-46. Jeffers originally raised the argument in an attempt to block the
second trial but was not able to persuade either the trial or the appellate courts to do so. 432
U.S. at 144.
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trial, thereby "waiving" his right to challenge the proceedings. 85
The Court then evaluated Jeffers' claim that his sentences for the
CCE conviction and the conspiracy convictions violated the multiple
punishment bar. The Court assumed that conspiracy to distribute narcotics is a lesser-included offense within CCE, 86 as CCE requires proof
of "concert[ed]" action between five or more individuals. 87 The Jeffers
Court did not hold that CCE and conspiracy are overlapping offenses,
however. 88 The Court instead turned to the legislative history of the
CCE statute, finding no conclusive evidence that Congress intended to
inflict cumulative punishment. 89 Its inquiry complete, 90 the Court
concluded that Jeffers had indeed suffered double punishment because
the lower court has fined him in excess of the statutory limit for CCE
convictions. 91 However, the Court expressly declined to decide
whether the imposition of concurrent sentences for conspiracy violated
the multiple punishment bar because Jeffers' life sentence without possibility for parole negated any possible adverse collateral
consequences. 92
The Court returned to analyze the relationship between CCE and
double jeopardy in Garrett v. United States. 93 Garrett pled guilty to
one count of importation of marijuana in the Western District of
Washington. 94 He was subsequently indicted and convicted in Florida
85. 432 U.S. at 154.
86. The Court based its assumption on the traditional Blockburger analysis. See 432 U.S. at
150 ("§ 846 is a lesser-included offense of§ 848, because§ 848 requires proof of every fact necessary to show a violation under§ 846"); 432 U.S. at 153 ("If the two charges had been tried in one
proceeding, it appears that [Jeffers] would have been entitled to a lesser-included offenseinstruction. ").
87. 432 U.S. at 148-49.
88. See 432 U.S. at 153 n.20 (Jeffers does not settle whether conspiracy is a lesser-included
offense "definitively.").
89. 432 U.S. at 155-57. As the Court noted, the House Report issued in conjunction with the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, supra note 2, indicates that
Congress intended CCE to constitute an exclusive penalty for those charged under its provisions.
See H.R. REP. No. 1444, supra note 1, pt. 1, at 10, reprinted in 1910 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4576
("Except when continuing criminal enterprises serve as the basis for an indictment ... [narcotics
offenses] will carry penalties which vary, depending upon the danger of the drugs involved.").
90. Though the Court had evaluated Jeffers' argument by the traditional method of analyzing the offenses under the B/ockburger test and then proceeding to examine congressional intent
for permission to impose cumulative punishment, it rather cryptically denied conducting the
two-step inquiry. Justice Blackmun maintained that because the Court had found no evidence of
legislative intent to authorize multiple punishments, "this again makes it unnecessary to reach
the lesser included offense issue." Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 155. The Court, however, scrutinized the
issue in precisely the opposite manner. The Court presumed that conspiracy was a lesser-included offense and then proceeded to examine congressional intent. See supra notes 86 & 88.
91. 432 U.S. at 157-58.
92. 432 U.S. at 155 n.24. The Court subsequently decided that convictions and sentences for
lesser-included offenses generally offend the Multiple Punishment Doctrine. See Ball v. United
States, 470 U.S. 856, 864-65 (1985); see also Thomas, supra note 11, at 1391-92 (arguing that Ball
implicitly overruled Jeffers).
93. 471 U.S. 773 (1985).
94. 471 U.S. at 775.
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for conspiring to possess marijuana with intent to distribute and for
participating in a CCE. 95 The government submitted proof of the
Washington importation scheme to establish one of the "continuing
series of violations" required by 21 U.S.C. § 848(c). 96 Garrett advanced two arguments on appeal. Initially, he argued that the use of
the Washington scheme at the Florida trial placed him twice in jeopardy for the Washington transaction. The Court summarily rejected
this claim, noting that Garrett's case fell within the well-recognized
rule that jeopardy does not attach until an individual has completed
all the elements of a crime. 97 Otherwise, the Court suggested, this
theory would force the government into the "absurd" position of permitting a drug dealer to continue his operations until it could amass
proof of a CCE violation.98
The Court also rejected Garrett's contention that the consecutive
sentences imposed for importation and CCE constituted excessive
punishment. The Court agreed that Garrett's offenses might be identical under the Blockburger test, 99 but it found that "[t]he language,
95. 471 U.S. at 776-77.
96. 471 U.S. at 776.
97. 471 U.S. at 787-93. See in this regard Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 n.7 (1977) ("An
exception [to the Double Jeopardy Clause] may exist where the State is unable to proceed on the
more serious charge at the outset because the additional facts necessary to sustain that charge
have not occurred ....").
98. Garrett, 471 U.S. at 785-86.
99. The Garrett Court cautioned in dicta against the "ready transposition of the 'lesser-included offense' principles of double jeopardy from the classically simple situation presented in
Brown [v. Ohio] to the multilayered conduct, both as to time and to place, involved in [a CCE
prosecution]." 471 U.S. at 789. The Court made this statement in the context of discussing
Garrett's successive prosecution claim. Yet the Court conducted the traditional, two-step inquiry into Garrett's multiple punishment claim. See 471 U.S. at 779-80 (conducting two-step
inquiry and concluding that "the Blockburger presumption must of course yield to a plainly
expressed contrary view on the part of Congress [regarding cumulative punishment]").
The Supreme Court has recently questioned the wisdom of applying the traditional lesserincluded offense analysis in "conspiracy prosecutions involv[ing] ... allegations of multilayered
conduct as to time and place." United States v. Felix, 112 S. Ct. 1377, 1385 (1992) (prosecution
for conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine following prior conviction for actual manufacture of the drug). Nonetheless, this Note analyzes CCE and conspiracy under the traditional
lesser-included analysis. Initially, the Court has followed the traditional lesser-included analysis
when analyzing the two crimes. See Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 150-51 (discussing lesser-included offense analysis in a CCE and conspiracy prosecution); Garrett, 471 U.S. at 794 (affirming in dicta
the notion that conspiracy is a lesser-included offense within CCE). Second, the Felix Court's
mode of analysis is inapposite to the multiple punishment inquiry in this Note. Felix did not
involve the CCE statute. Moreover, Felix raised a subsequent prosecution claim rather than a
multiple punishment claim. See 112 S. Ct. at 1380. The Court's holding in Jeffers, later upheld
in Garrett, that Congress did not intend to punish CCE and conspiracy cumulatively, is intact.
Finally, while conspiracy and a substantive crime are generally separate offenses, conspiracy usually is a lesser-included offense of a crime involving concerted criminal activity. Iannelli v.
United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 (1975). This notion has been termed "Wharton's Rule." In
Iannelli, the Court discussed the operation of Wharton's Rule:
Wharton's Rule applies only to offenses that require concerted criminal activity, a plurality of criminal agents. In such cases, a closer relationship exists between the conspiracy and
the substantive offense because both require collective criminal activity. The substantive
offense therefore presents some of the same threats that the law of conspiracy normally is
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structure, and legislative history of [the Act] show in the plainest way
that Congress intended the CCE provision to be a separate criminal
offense which [is] punishable in addition to, and not as a substitute for,
the predicate offenses." 100 The Court issued a limited holding compatible with Jeffers - that Congress had authorized cumulative punishment for "substantive predicate offenses." 101 But the Court's
conclusion that substantive predicate offenses are not lesser-included
offenses within CCE undermined Jeffers. The Jeffers Court's assumption that conspiracy constitutes an offense included within CCE remained intact, however, because the Garrett majority recognized that
Jeffers "reasonably concluded that the dangers posed by a conspiracy
and a CCE were similar and thus there would be little purpose in cumulating the penalties."102
The Supreme Court's decisions regarding double jeopardy and
CCE have not provided lower federal courts with clear guidance to
resolve multiple punishment claims. Under Garrett, the government
can punish defendants cumulatively for CCE and substantive narcotics offenses - that is, the actual importation, manufacture, or distribution of controlled substances. The Court has not resolved other
multiple punishment issues, however. For instance, the Jeffers Court
declined to decide whether conspiracy is a lesser-included offense
within CCE. While Garrett followed in dicta the Jeffers Court's assumption that CCE encompasses conspiracy, the issue remains open.
Moreover, Jeffers raised other issues. The Court only reduced Jeffers'
fine and did not touch his concurrent prison sentences. The Court
also declined to discuss Jeffers' simultaneous convictions, although
Ball, decided eight years later, appears to require the vacation of
lesser-included convictions. Lower courts must decide whether this
portion of Jeffers is still viable after Ball. The next Part examines the
results of several years of struggle among the federal courts to answer
these questions. Not surprisingly, the circuit courts of appeals have
generated varying responses to excessive punishment claims advanced
by defendants convicted of both conspiracy and CCE.
thought to guard against, and it cannot automatically be assumed that the Legislature intended the conspiracy and the substantive offense to remain as discrete crimes upon consummation of the latter. Thus, absent legislative intent to the contrary, the Rule supports a
presumpti'on that the two merge when the substantive offense is proved.
420 U.S. at 785-86 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Wharton's Rule is applicable to complex statutory crimes. See Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 147-51. Wharton's Rule and lesser-included analysis thus control if continuing criminal enterprise requires proof of concerted activity and
Congress has not authorized cumulative punishment. See infra text accompanying notes 170-78.
100. 471 U.S. at 779.
101. 471 U.S. at 794 (emphasis added).
102. 471 U.S. at 794; see also United States v. Maza, 983 F.2d 1004, 1009 (11th Cir. 1993)
("These decisions [holding conspiracy to be included within the definition of CCE] were not
disturbed by the Supreme Court's ruling in Garrett ... that the substantive, predicate offenses, as
distinguished from conspiracy, were not lesser-included offenses of CCE for purposes of double
jeopardy.") (footnote omitted).
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II. THE FEDERAL CIRCUITS' TREATMENT OF CCE AND
CONSPIRACY UNDER THE MULTIPLE PUNISHMENT DOCTRINE
Part I concluded that the Supreme Court's treatment of multiple
punishment claims involving CCE and conspiracy has shrouded the
parameters of the Multiple Punishment Doctrine. The courts of appeals differ in their responses to the Court's unsettled jurisprudence.
This Part examines several methods for dealing with multiple convictions for CCE and conspiracy. Section II.A analyzes the approach
advocated by a majority of courts, which vacate both separate convictions and sentences imposed for conspiracy. Section II.B reviews three
competing doctrines - the Second Circuit's combination approach,
the Third Circuit's retention of separate convictions without sentences, and the Seventh Circuit's allowance of both convictions and
concurrent sentences for conspiracy.
A.

The Majority Rule -

Vacating Convictions and Sentences

A majority of the circuit courts of appeals have concluded that
allowing the conviction of a defendant for conspiracy in addition to
CCE violates the Multiple Punishment Doctrine. 103 The circuits adhering to the majority "vacation" rule can be separated into two
camps. Some of the circuits reason that Jeffers v. United States 104 prohibits cumulative punishment for CCE and conspiracy, believing that
the Jeffers Court held that conspiracy is a lesser-included offense
within CCE. 105 Other circuits combine Jeffers with the Court's decision in Ball v. United States 106 - which held that convictions for
lesser-included offenses violate the multiple punishment bar by generating adverse collateral consequences - to invalidate conspiracy convictions.107 Although both approaches achieve the same result, this
Note follows the circuits relying on Ball in analyzing the multiple punishment issue. 108

103. See, e.g., United States v. Montanye, 962 F.2d 1332, 1346-47 (8th Cir. 1992); United
States v. David, 940 F.2d 722, 738 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2301 (1992); United
States v. Jones, 918 F.2d 909, 910-11 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam); United States v. Rivera, 900
F.2d 1462, 1478 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Butler, 885 F.2d 195, 201-02 (4th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Schuster, 769 F.2d 337, 344-45 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 1021
(1986); United States v. Smith, 703 F.2d 627, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam); United States v.
Michel, 588 F.2d 986, 1001 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 825 (1979).
104. 432 U.S. 137 (1977).
105. See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
106. 470 U.S. 856 (1985).
107. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
108. See infra notes 184-98 and accompanying text.
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The District of Columbia, 109 Fourth, 11 0 Fifth, 111 Tenth, 11 2 and
Eleventh 113 Circuits, although joining in the majority result, have
conducted only a cursory examination of the Multiple Punishment
Doctrine and concluded that a defendant cannot be punished
for both greater- and lesser-included offenses. These circuits
simply assume that Jeffers held that CCE and conspiracy cannot
be punished simultaneously. 114 This assumption is simply wrong;
Jeffers reserved for decision the issue of whether the narcotics conspiracy and CCE statutes overlap. 115 Moreover, as one court has
109. United States v. Smith, 703 F.2d 627 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
110. United States v. Butler, 885 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1989); see also United States v. Lyles,
No. 91-6278, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 5529, at *1-3 (4th Cir. Apr. 5, 1991) (per curiam). Before
Butler, the Fourth Circuit adhered to the view espoused by the Third Circuit and allowed conspiracy convictions to stand but vacated conspiracy sentences. See, e.g., United States v. West,
877 F.2d 281, 292 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989); United States v. Porter, 821 F.2d
968, 978 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 934 (1988). Since the decision in Butler, one
district court attempted to adopt the Second Circuit's "combination" doctrine, which merges the
conspiracy convictions into the CCE conviction to guarantee that a felon is punished in the event
that the CCE conviction is later vacated on appeal. See United States v. Fuentes, 729 F. Supp.
487, 491-93 (E.D. Va. 1989). The Fourth Circuit, acknowledging that it had given "mixed signals" on the issue, thwarted the district court's attempt and held simply that Butler was controlling. United States v. Tanner, No. 89-5237, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 19956, at *15-18 (4th Cir.
Nov. 9, 1990) (per curiam), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1397 (1991).
111. United States v. Michel, 588 F.2d 986 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 825 (1979).
112. United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1478 (10th Cir. 1990); see also United States v.
Stallings, 810 F.2d 973, 975-76 (10th Cir. 1987). One panel in the Tenth Circuit attempted to
adopt the combination approach heralded by the Second Circuit. See United States v. Staggs,
881 F.2d 1546, 1548 (10th Cir. 1989). The decision has apparently been ignored in subsequent
cases, however. See Rivera, 900 F.2d at 1478.
113. United States v. Jones, 918 F.2d 909 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam). Two panels in the
Eleventh Circuit have vacated conspiracy convictions on appeal and noted that those convictions
are "merged" into the CCE conviction. E.g., United States v. Alvarez-Moreno, 874 F.2d 1402,
1414 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1032 (1990); United States v. Brantley, 733 F.2d
1429, 1436 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1006 (1985). Though this language replicates
the phrasing used by those circuits adhering to the "combination approach," the Eleventh Circuit has not referred to the possibility that the conspiracy convictions might be resurrected to
justify a defendant's incarceration upon reversal of a CCE count. The courts are apparently
referring to the presumption - labeled Wharton's Rule - that a conspiracy offense merges with
the substantive offense for sentencing purposes when the conspiracy is a lesser-included offense.
See Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785-86 (1975). Hence, this Note presumes that the
Eleventh Circuit has not adopted the combination method.
114. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 918 F.2d 909, 910 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) ("The
Supreme Court ... [has] held that when a conspiracy serves as a predicate act for a CCE conviction based upon the same criminal agreement, the conspiracy conviction merges into the CCE
conviction.") (citing Jeffers); United States v. Porter, 821 F.2d 968, 978 (4th Cir. 1987) ("Congress did not intend that an individual be punished under both § 846 (conspiracy) and § 848
(continuing criminal enterprise).") (citing Jeffers), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 934 (1988); United
States v. Michel, 588 F.2d 986, 1001 (5th Cir.) ("Because conspiracy ... is a lesser-included
offense to conducting a continuing criminal enterprise, it cannot support a separate conviction
and sentence.") (citing Jeffers), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 825 (1979).
115. Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 153 n.20; see also United States v. Maza, 9.83 F.2d 1004, 1009 n.9
(11th Cir. 1993) ("Jeffers cannot be cited as holding that[§] 846 is a lesser-included offense of the
CCE [offense] because this was not necessary to its decision."); United States v. Aguilar, 849
F.2d 92, 98 (3d Cir. 1988) ("Although many courts have assumed otherwise, often relying on
concessions to this effect by the government, we believe that Jeffers quite clearly did not hold

2238

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 91:2220

argued, 116 Jeffers allowed the imposition of concurrent sentences so
long as the cumulative punishment did not exceed the statutory maximum.117 Because Jeffers had been sentenced to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole, the Court let stand his concurrent
sentence for conspiracy. 118 At best, these circuits' failure to evaluate
multiple punishment claims in a more detailed fashion undercuts the
logical force of the decisions because ref'erence to the values underlying a legal rule is often crucial in judicial decisionmaking. 11 9 Worse,
the reasoning utilized by these courts may w'eaken the credibility of
the majority approach, as evinced by the difficulty which subsequent
courts have faced in justifying precedent when confronted with the
government's advocacy of one of the minority views. 120
The remaining circuits adhering to the majority rule - the
First, 121 Sixth, 122 and Eighth 123 - rely on the Supreme Court's deciconspiracy to be a lesser offense included within the greater crime of engaging in a CCE."), cert.

denied, 498 U.S. 962 (1990).
116. United States v. Bond, 847 F.2d 1233, 1239 (7th Cir. 1988) ("The conclusion that con·
current sentences may be imposed under § 846 and § 848 has the support of Jeffers, where this
happened.").
117. Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 156-58.
118. 432 U.S. at 155 n.24.
119. See supra text accompanying note 29.
120. See, e.g., Tanner, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 19956, at *17 (responding to an argument
urging adoption of the Second Circuit's "combination" approach without attempting to justify
Fourth Circuit precedent).
121. United States v. David, 940 F.2d 722, 738-39 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2301
(1991); see also United States v. Cloutier, 966 F.2d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Abreu,
952 F.2d 1458, 1464-65 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1695 (1992); United States v. Rivera·
. Martinez, 931 F.2d 148, 152-53 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 184 (1991); Restrepo v. United
States, 761 F. Supp. 211, 213-16 (D. Mass. 1991).
In Cloutier, the district court seemingly adopted the Second Circuit's combination approach
at the urging of the government. See Cloutier, 966 F.2d at 27 ("The [district] court agreed with
the government and merged the conspiracy and CCE sentences into one, so that there were two
convictions and one sentence for the two counts."). The circuit court avoided the question "of
whether the [district] court erred in merging the conspiracy and CCE counts,'' leaving that issue
"for another day." 966 F.2d at 30-31.
122. United States v. Schuster, 769 F.2d 337, 343-45 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1021 (1986). The Schuster court actually instructed the trial court to vacate the conspiracy con·
victions and "merge them into the continuing criminal enterprise offense." 769 F.2d at 345. The
court then cryptically added that the merger would "have limited effect on the sentence imposed
under section 848 [CCE], for there was no consecutive time or fine imposed under the conspiracy
charges." 769 F.2d at 345. The court did not clarify whether it was attempting to preserve the
conspiracy convictions for resuscitation or simply noting that conspiracy is a lesser-included
offense. See supra note 113.
Two subsequent decisions in the Sixth Circuit shed little light on the issue. In United States
v. Paulino, 935 F.2d 739 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 315 (1991), the panel remanded the
case to the trial court for vacation of the conspiracy conviction without reference to a "merger"
of the two counts. 935 F.2d at 751. A subsequent decision by the Sixth Circuit alluded to
merging conspiracy and CCE convictions but did not direct the trial court to do so. Rather, the
court of appeals remanded the case to allow the trial court to choose which conviction to retain,
since an anomaly in the sentencing guidelines made the defendant's sentence higher for conspiracy than for CCE. United States v. Chambers, 944 F.2d 1253, 1268-69 (6th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1217 (1992).
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sion in Ball v. United States 124 for the conclusion that concurrent
lesser-included convictions violate the multiple punishment bar. 125
These circuits combine the implication of Jeffers - that conspiracy is
a lesser-included offense within CCE - with the holding in Ball that
convictions for lesser-included offenses entail adverse collateral consequences offensive to the Multiple Punishment Doctrine. 126 These circuits recognize that lesser-included conspiracy convictions result in
double punishment because they may enhance subsequent sentences
under recidivist statutes or be used to impeach trial testimony.w
While other courts have questioned the doctrinal merit of the vacation
approach, 128 the majority rule circuits resting on both Jeffers and Ball
have successfully defended their analysis against the minority views.
B. Minority Approaches

Four circuits have concluded that relevant precedent does not require the elimination of convictions or sentences for conspiracy when
a defendant faces punishment for engaging in a continuing criminal
enterprise. The Second and Ninth Circuits adhere to the view· that
"combining" conspiracy and CCE convictions into one conviction
mitigates any cumulative punishment concerns. The Third Circuit argues that retaining convictions for both CCE and conspiracy, while
vacating conspiracy sentences, is consistent with the Multiple Punishment Doctrine. Finally, the Seventh Circuit perceives the additional
punishment imposed by the retention of concurrent sentences to be
consistent with that authorized by the Court and Congress.
1.

The Combination Approach

The Second Circuit has proposed a unique alternative to the majority rule. Rather than vacating a defendant's conspiracy convic123. United States v. Montanye, 962 F.2d 1332, 1346-47 (8th Cir. 1992); see also United
States v. Holt, 969 F.2d 685, 687 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Duke, 940 F.2d 1113, 1120
(8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Possick, 849 F.2d 332, 341 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Grubbs, 829 F.2d 18, 19 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Maull, 806 F.2d 1340, 1346-47 (8th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 907 (1987).
124. 470 U.S. 856 (1985).
125. See, e.g., Duke, 940 F.2d at 1120 ("[T]he Court has made it clear that the second conviction and not merely the second sentence violates the [D]ouble [J]eopardy [C]lause.") (citing
Ball); Rivera-Martinez, 931 F.2d at 148 ("Ball . .. serves as our polestar."); Schuster, 169 F.2d at
344 ("Because the CCE and conspiracy charges are not subject to double punishment, the [conspiracy convictions] must be vacated.") (citing Ball).
126. See, e.g., Duke, 940 F.2d at 1120; Rivera-Martinez, 931 F.2d at 152-53; Schuster, 169
F.2d at 344-45.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 50-62.
128. See United States v. Fernandez, 916 F.2d 125, 128-29 (3d Cir. 1990) (arguing that the
majority rule "frustrates ... [c]ongressional intent and is surely not required by the [D]ouble
[J]eopardy [C]lause"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2249 (1991); United States v. Bond, 847 F.2d 1233,
1239 (7th Cir. 1988) (rejecting majority rule because Jeffers permits concurrent sentencing "provided [that] the cumulative punishment does not exceed the maximum under the CCE Act").

2240

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 91:2220

tions, the Second Circuit advocates "combining" those charges with
the CCE count so that only one conviction remains. 129 If an appellate
court then reverses a defendant's continuing criminal enterprise conviction, the court will automatically reinstate the conspiracy convictions so that the defendant will not elude punishment.13o
Although some circuits reject the Second Circuit's rule, 131 the
Ninth Circuit recently has adopted the "combination approach." 132
The Ninth Circuit had been the most haphazard jurisdiction in this
area, having implici~ly reversed its stance twice. The Ninth Circuit
initially viewed only conspiracy sentences imposed consecutively to a
CCE sentence as offensive to the prohibition against cumulative punishment.133 Following the Supreme Court's decision in Ball, however,
another panel in the circuit concluded that even concurrent sentences
"constitute[] cumulative punishment." 134 A few years later another
panel again altered the circuit's doctrinal approach to the multiple
punishment problem. In United States v. Medina, 135 the court noted
that the majority rule places district courts "in a bind"13 6 because it
requires a sentencing judge to vacate otherwise valid convictions despite the potential reversal of the CCE conviction. 137 The court concluded that authorizing district court judges to sentence in the
alternative presents a "more efficient course." 138 Hence, if an appellate court reverses the CCE charge, "the conviction and sentence on
the lesser-included counts will be effective and subject to the same appeal," avoiding "needless remand." 139 Although the Ninth Circuit
seems to have joined forces with the Second Circuit, 140 it has done so
129. See United States v. Aiello, 771 F.2d 621, 632-35 (2d Cir. 1985); see also United States
v. Benevento, 836 F.2d 60, 73 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1043 (1988); United States v.
Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 383-84 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1021 (1988); United States v.
Osorio Estrada, 751 F.2d 128, 134-35 (2d Cir. 1984), modified on other grounds, 151 F.2d 27 (2d
Cir.), and cert. denied, 474 U.S. 830 (1985).
130. Aiello, 171 F.2d at 634 n.6 ("[l]f the conviction of the greater offense were eventually to
be overturned, our practice would, by design, resuscitate the lesser conviction and thereby ensure
that the defendant would not avoid punishment ....").
131. See United States v. Rivera-Martinez, 931 F.2d 148, 152-53 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 184 (1991); United States v. Tanner, No. 89-5237, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 19956, at *17-18
(4th Cir. Nov. 9, 1990), modifyingpercuriam United States v. Fuentes, 729 F. Supp. 487, 492-93
(E.D. Va. 1989) (adopting the combination approach), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1397 (1991);
Restrepo v. United States, 761 F. Supp. 211, 216-17 (D. Mass. 1991).
132. United States v. Medina, 940 F.2d 1247, 1253 (9th Cir. 1991).
133. See United States v. Burt, 765 F.2d 1364, 1368-69 (9th Cir. 1985).
134. United States v. Hernandez-Escarsega, 886 F.2d 1560, 1582 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 1003 (1990).
135. 940 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1991).
136. 940 F.2d at 1253.
137. 940 F.2d at 1253.
138. 940 F.2d at 1253.
139. 940 F.2d at 1253.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 129-30 (describing the Second Circuit's adherence to
the combination approach).
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without officially recognizing the alliance. 141
Courts advocating the "combination approach" have identified
three reasons for doing so. First, the merging of separate convictions
into a single count averts adverse collateral consequences from the
conspiracy charges.· As only one conviction remains following the
merger, the conspiracy convictions will not harm a defendant in a collateral manner. 142 Additionally, "the reactivation of the lesser conviction facilitates the congressional'purpose of ensuring that a defendant
is punished for whatever degree of a crime he is adjudged to be guilty
of having committed." 143 Finally, as Medina recognized, merging the
conspiracy and CCE convictions reduces a potential burden on judicial resources. The "combination approach" eliminates the need to
remand a case for vacation of the conspiracy convictions, because
when the CCE count is affirmed, "the vacation will have been accomplished automatically."144
2. Permitting Simultaneous Convictions
The Third Circuit allows the retention of both CCE and conspiracy convictions while requiring the vacation of sentences received for
the lesser-included conspiracy charges. In United States v. Grayson, 145
the court identified conspiracy as a lesser-included offense within CCE
and recognized that imposing punishments for both crimes would vio141. The Medina court did not cite any Second Circuit cases in adopting the combination
method. See 940 F.2d at 1253.
142. E.g., United States v. Aiello, 771 F.2d 621, 633 (2d Cir. 1985) ("A combined lesser
conviction could not properly be considered, for instance, in determining a defendant's eligibility
for parole, in sentencing him in the future under a recidivist statute or impeaching his credibility
at a later trial."); United States v. Fuentes, 729 F. Supp. 487, 493 (E.D. Va. 1989) (combining
convictions avoids cumulative punishment), modified per curiam sub nom. United States v. Tanner, 917 F.2d 1302 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1397 (1991).
143. Aiello, 771 F.2d at 634; see also Fuentes, 729 F. Supp. at 493 (merging convictions
"minimizes the risk that [a] defendant's criminal conduct will go unpunished"); cf. Medina, 940
F.2d at 1253 (majority rule leaves courts "powerless to reinstate the potentially valid lesserincluded counts of conviction"). The Aiello court concluded that there is "no practical difference
between [Ball's] prescription to vacate a conviction and our practice of 'combining' a lesser conviction into a conviction on the greater offense." 771 F.2d at 634 n.6. The Fuentes court
weighed the relative interests involved, concluding that "[a]ny inherent punitive effect flowing
from the continuing existence of the merged lesser-included offense conviction ... is outweighed
by the interest in ensuring that those convicted of serious crimes do not unjustifiably escape
punishment." 729 F. Supp. at 493.
144. 940 F.2d at 1253. For a full critique of this argument, see infra section 111.C. At a
minimum, in the event that an appellate court reverses a CCE conviction, a remand will be
necessary to determine the defendant's sentence for conspiracy. The defendant will not have
been sentenced for the resuscitated conviction, a condition necessary to justify the continued
incarceration of the defendant. For example, appellate courts exercising the inherent power to
impose a conviction for a lesser-included offense when reversing a conviction for a greater offense
must remand the case for sentencing. See, e.g., United States v. Plenty Arrows, 946 F.2d 62, 67
(8th Cir. 1991) (remanding case for resentencing upon imposing a conviction on a lesser-included
offense).
145. 795 F.2d 278 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1018 (1987).
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late the prohibition on multiple punishment. 146 The panel concluded
that, "since it is the 'cumulation of sentence' which is illegal, we are
not required to vacate [the conspiracy and CCE] convictions." 147 The
Third Circuit justified its rejection of the majority rule in United States
v. Fernandez. 148 Fernandez challenged the district court's refusal to
expunge his conspiracy convictions, relying on the Supreme Court's
decision in Ball 149 Rejecting Fernandez' plea to adopt the majority
approach, the Third Circuit maintained that "the narcotics conspiracy
statutes of which Fernandez was convicted and the continuing criminal enterprise statute have different purposes."150
The Third Circuit has offered two justifications for retaining conspiracy convictions when a defendant is also convicted of engaging in a
continuing criminal enterprise. First, the Third Circuit divines congressional intent "that predicate conspiracy and continuing criminal
enterprise convictions may stand," 151 thereby justifying any collateral
consequences generated by the retention of separate convictions. 152
Moreover, the Third Circuit argues that simultaneous convictions
serve society's interest in ensuring that the guilty do not escape punishment, because upon reversal of the CCE count the government can
rely upon the conspiracy convictions to justify a defendant's
incarceration. 153
3. Allowing Convictions and Concurrent Sentences

The Seventh Circuit has held that not only is retention of separate
convictions for conspiracy permissible, but imposing sentences for
those offenses is also constitutional so long as the cumulative punish146. 795 F.2d at 287 (citing Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 794 (1985)).
147. 795 F.2d at 287. A subsequent opinion appears to repudiate the reasoning contained in
Grayson. In United States v. Aguilar, 849 F.2d 92 (3d Cir. 1988), the Third Circuit reversed the
CCE conviction of a prisoner who had previously pied guilty to conspiracy. After designating
conspiracy as a lesser-included offense of CCE, the court reasoned that "the proper remedy ••• is
to reverse [the] CCE conviction, and not simply to vacate the sentence •.• received for that
conviction." 849 F.2d at 96 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 924 (1988), and cert. denied, 498
U.S. 962 (1980). Aguilar did not overrule Grayson, however, because the court cautioned that its
decision was "not concerned with the [D]ouble [J]eopardy [C]lause's protection against multiple
punishments." 849 F.2d at 99.
148. 916 F.2d 125 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2249 (1991).
149. 916 F.2d at 126.
150. 916 F.2d at 127. Compare Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 156 ("[s]ection 848 itself reflects a comprehensive penalty structure that leaves little opportunity for pyramiding of penalties") with Garrett, 471 U.S. at 794 ("the dangers posed by a conspiracy and a CCE [are] similar and thus there
would be little purpose in cumulating the penalties").
151. 916 F.2d at 128. The Fernandez court also opined that any collateral consequences
flowing from the conspiracy convictions would not be "additional punishment" since the "same
consequences" would naturally result from the initial CCE conviction. 916 F.2d at 128. This
argument seemingly misapprehends the concept of adverse collateral consequences as explained
in Ball. See infra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
152. See 916 F.2d at 128-29.
153. Fernandez, 916 F.2d at 127-28.
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ment does not exceed the maximum authorized by the CCE statute. 154
In United States v. Bond, 155 the court concluded that this approach
comports with the Supreme Court's pronouncements regarding multiple punishment. 156 The Bond court argued that Congress had authorized these concurrent sentences: "It is not illogical to convict a person
both of agreeing to do something [conspiracy] and succeeding on a
grand scale [operating a continuing criminal enterprise]." 157 Additionally, Bond stressed that the Supreme Court in Jeffers upheld concurrent sentences on appeal, 158 which the Bond court interpreted as a
confirmation that the retention of separate sentences is constitutionally
permissible. 159 Finally, Bond rejected the notion that adverse collateral consequences might attach to conspiracy convictions, as "the unavailability of parole on the CCE conviction ensures that the
multiplication of convictions does not count against the defendant at
parole time." 160
The advantages of the Seventh Circuit's method of dealing with
conspiracy and CCE are nearly identical to the "combination" approach advocated by the Second and Ninth Circuits. First, the retention of conspiracy convictions allows the government to continue to
154. This caveat creates minimal protection for the criminal defendant, as 21 U.S.C. § 848(b)
& (d) allows a person convicted of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise to be sentenced to

life in prison without possibility of parole.
155. 847 F.2d 1233 (7th Cir. 1988).
156. Bond overruled sub silentio United States v. Jefferson, 714 F.2d 689, 703-06 (7th Cir.
1983), which required the vacation of convictions and sentences received for conspiracy when a
defendant has also been convicted of operating a CCE. See United States v. Bafia, 949 F.2d 1465,
1472-1473 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1989 (1992). For an account of "the rather
confusing progression of Jefferson ... and its subsequent history,'' see Bafia, 949 F.2d at 1472-73.
Bond's method of decisionmaking has been criticized within the circuit. See United States v.
Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 754 (7th Cir. 1988) (reluctantly adhering to Bond because of stare
decisis), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 908 (1989). Bond has also been eroded. In United States v. Alvarez, 860 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1051 (1989), a different panel in the
Seventh Circuit remanded a case for resentencing even though the trial court had imposed concurrent sentences in accordance with Bond. The court highlighted the "distinct possibility that
the district court may have considered [the defendant's] guilt on the conspiracy conviction in
sentencing him on the CCE conviction." 860 F.2d at 830. The court evaded Bond by suggesting
that long CCE sentences might be presumptively invalid under Jeffers when a defendant has also
been sentenced on conspiracy charges. 860 F.2d at 830 n.31; see also Bafia, 942 F.2d at 1474 ("it
seems clear that the [defendant's] conspiracy sentence affected the CCE sentence in clear violation of Alvarez"); United States v. Pace, 898 F.2d 1218, 1238 (7th Cir. 1990) (sentencing judge
"may not take the conspiracy conviction into account when sentencing ... on the CCE count").
But see United States v. Canino, 949 F.2d 928, 949 (7th Cir. 1991) (upholding 26-year concurrent terms for CCE and conspiracy because the "cumulative punishment clearly does not exceed
the maximum allowable under the CCE conviction"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1940 (1992).
157. 847 F.2d at 1238. The Seventh Circuit's reading of both Supreme Court precedent and
congressional intent appears to suffer from the same deficiencies as the Third Circuit's approach.
See infra text accompanying notes 212-18.
158. See supra text accompanying note 92.
159. 847 F.2d at 1239.
160. 847 F.2d at 1239. This argument ignores the potential for multiple convictions to affect
collaterally a defendant's sentence under a recidivist statute, as well as the possibility for impeachment, identified by the Supreme Court in Ball. See infra section 111.B.
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incarcerate a prisoner who successfully challenges a CCE conviction
but remains guilty of conspiracy. 161 Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit's approach avoids needless remands and thereby conserves judicial resources. If an appellate court reverses a CCE conviction, the
conspiracy conviction remains intact, while the same result "would
require extra motion if the [conspiracy] sentences had to be vacated
... and resurrected at some future time."162
To summarize, the circuit courts of appeals have announced four
differing interpretations of the Supreme Court's pronouncements on
multiple punishment in the realm of CCE and conspiracy: vacating
conspiracy convictions, combining conspiracy convictions with the
CCE conviction, permitting simultaneous convictions without
sentences, and allowing both simultaneous convictions and concurrent
sentences. Each approach claims the support of Supreme Court precedent. The analysis in the next Part, however, concludes that only the
majority vacation approach comports with the Court's pronouncements in Jeffers and Garrett and also eliminates the potential for multiple punishment through adverse collateral consequences.
III. .APPLYING THE MULTIPLE PUNISHMENT FRAMEWORK TO
THE CIRCUITS' APPROACHES
This Part scrutinizes the interaction between continuing criminal
enterprise and conspiracy, utilizing the test for Multiple Punishment
Doctrine violations outlined in Part I. Section III.A analyzes the two
crimes from the standpoint of established cumulative punishment jurisprudence and argues that the minority approaches that impose concurrent convictions or sentences for the two offenses stray from
Supreme Court precedent. Section III.B more specifically examines
the approaches generated by the Third and Seventh Circuits and rejects them as being inconsistent with the multiple punishment bar.
Section IIl.C compares the vacation approach with the combination
method and argues that the vacation approach alone is consistent with
the Multiple Punishment Doctrine. This Part concludes that the vacation approach advocated by a majority of the courts of appeals best
addresses the issue of cumulative punishment.
A.

CCE and Conspiracy Under the Two-Step Inquiry

Part I outlined the Supreme Court's two-step analysis of cumulative punishment claims. 163 In order to establish a Multiple Punish161. 847 F.2d at 1238.
162. 847 F.2d at 1238-39. The Seventh Circuit approach appears to avoid some of the difficulty inherent in the "combination" approach in this respect. An appellate court reversing a
CCE conviction will not need to remand the case to the trial court to impose sentence on the
remaining conspiracy counts if concurrent sentences are imposed. See supra note 144.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 67-78.
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ment Doctrine violation, a defendant must prove that the two offenses
are "the same" - that is, that one offense is necessarily included
within the definition of the other - and that Congress has not clearly
authorized punishment for the two offenses. This Note posits that
conspiracy is a lesser-included offense within CCE; thus, the offenses
are "the same" for the purposes of multiple punishment inspection. 164
The first step in the multiple punishment inquiry is to examine the
nexus between the CCE and·conspiracy statutes to determine whether
the offenses are the same under the Blockburger test. 165 The two
crimes clearly overlap under the test. Initially, the statutes describe
identical offenses. By satisfying the requirements of the CCE statute,
the government will necessarily prove that a defendant conspired to
violate narcotics laws. The CCE statute directs the prosecutor to establish that a defendant has committed a series of violations of the
narcotics laws 166 "in concert with five or more other persons." 167
Proof that a defendant acted in concert with at least five other individuals in the course of his criminal activities will involve evidence of at
least one conspiracy. 168 In order to demonstrate that a defendant has
conspired to violate the narcotics laws, a prosecutor therefore need not
offer any proof independent of that required by the CCE statute.
Moreover, courts uniformly agree that conspiracy is indeed a
lesser-included offense within the CCE statute. The Court in Jeffers,
while not prepared to declare definitively the two offenses to be the
same for double jeopardy purposes, 169 did note that "the phrase 'in
concert' . . . has generally connoted cooperative action and agree164. As previously noted, the Supreme Court has repudiated somewhat the lesser-included
offense test in the context of complex prosecutions involving "multilayered conduct." United
States v. Felix, 112 S. Ct. 1377, 1385 (1992); see also Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 789
(1985). In Felix. however, the Court merely reaffirmed the general rule (noted in Garrett) that
"conspiracy to commit an offense and the offense itself . . . are separate offenses for double
jeopardy purposes." 112 S. Ct. at 1385. This type of analysis is inappropriate when conspiracy is
an element of a "substantive" offense. Wharton's Rule creates "an exception to the general principle that a conspiracy and the substantive offense that is its immediate end are discrete crimes
for which separate sanctions may be imposed." Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 771
(1975). See supra note 99.
165. This Note analyzes the CCE and conspiracy offenses under the Blockburger rule rather
than relying on the assumption in Jeffers that the crimes are identical, as some majority-rule
jurisdictions have done. See supra text accompanying notes 109-20.
166. 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2) (1988).
167. 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2)(A) (1988).
168. The government may choose to rely on substantive offenses (that is, actual importation
and distribution) rather than conspkacy to establish the "series of violations" required by 21
U.S.C. § 848(c)(2). The prosecutorial strategy in such an instance will not obviate the need for
proof of conspiracy, however. The government would have to establish that the substantive
predicate offenses were masterminded by the defendant in coordination with at least five persons,
which necessarily involves evidence of conspiratorial conduct. See Jeffers v. United States, 432
U.S. 137, 148 (1977) ("Even if § 848 were read to require individual agreements between the
leader of the enterprise and each of the other five necessary participants, enough would be shown
to prove a conspiracy.").
169. Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 153 n.20.
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ment." 170 The Court would probably be unwilling to renounce the
assumption given that its interpretation in Jeffers comports with the
generally accepted meaning of the term. Indeed, the Court's subsequent admonition in Garrett that the "dangers posed by a conspiracy
and CCE [are] similar" 171 confirms the view that courts should regard
conspiracy as a lesser-included offense of CCE. Finally, the circuit
courts of appeals unanimously view conspiracy and CCE as lesser and
greater offenses. 112
The second step in a multiple punishment inquiry - inspecting
legislative intent for authority to cumulate punishments - compels
the conclusion that Congress intended to punish either CCE or conspiracy but not both. A survey of the structure and history of the continuing criminal enterprise statute does not indicate that Congress has
"clear[ly]" 173 and "specially"1 74 condoned punishment for conspiring
to violate narcotics laws and engaging in a CCE. The CCE statute
"reflects a comprehensive penalty structure that leaves little opportunity for pyramiding of penalties." 175 The legislative history of the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 supports a similar conclusion. Congress intended penalties for violations
of the Act to vary with the dangerousness of the narcotics involved,
"[e]xcept when continuing criminal enterprises serve as the basis for
an indictment." 176 This language suggests that the judiciary should
consider the penalties as exclusive rather than cumulative; 177 a conviction under the CCE statute should bar other criminal liability based on
the same conduct. The Supreme Court has accepted this conclusion.178 Thus, while "[i]t is not illogical to convict a person of both
agreeing to do something [conspiracy] and succeeding on a grand scale
[by operating a continuing criminal enterprise]," 179 the CCE statute,
by its terms, already does so. 180 Moreover, one must view congres170. 432 U.S. at 149 n.14.
171. Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 794 (1985).
172. See United States v. Aguilar, 849 F.2d 92, 98 n.11 (3d Cir. 1988) (collecting cases), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 962 (1990).
173. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 692 (1980).
174. Whalen, 445 U.S. at 693; see also Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368 (1983) (Con·
gress must "specifically authorize[] cumulative punishment"); Albernaz v. United States, 450
U.S. 333, 340 (1981) (Blockburger rule of statutory construction is controlling absent "a clear
indication of contrary legislative intent").
175. Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 156 (1977).
176. H.R. REP. No. 1444, supra note l, pt. 1, at 10, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566,
4576 (emphasis added).
177. See Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 156 n.26.
178. See Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 157 ("[T]he reason for separate penalties for conspiracies lies in
the additional dangers posed by concerted activity. Section 848, however, already expressly prohibits this kind of conduct."); see also Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. at 774 (1985).
179. United States v. Bond, 847 F.2d 1233, 1238 (7th Cir. 1988).
180. See Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 156-57 ("The policy reasons usually offered to justify separate
punishment of conspiracies and underlying substantive offenses, however, are inapplicable to
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sional intent in light of the Multiple Punishment Doctrine, which operates as a presumption in favor of lenity, forbidding cumulative
punishment unless clearly authorized by the legislature. 181 The evidence regarding legislative authorization to cumulate the penalties for
CCE and conspiracy is, at best, "inconclusive." 182 Indeed, no court
has marshalled evidence of congressional intent to allow cumulative
punishment.1 83
The above traditional, lesser-included analysis compels the conclusion that the government may not punish CCE and conspiracy cumulatively. However, courts should look to the underlying protections
afforded a criminal defendant by the Multiple Punishment Doctrine to
complete the multiple punishment inquiry. 184 Whether the protections are undermined essentially depends on the existence of adverse
collateral consequences, which affect the criminal defendant's interest
in finality. 185 The other interests served by the doctrine - protecting
against prosecutorial overreaching and preserving the separation of
powers - rest on the assumption that a defendant's sentence exceeds
that authorized by the legislature. In the CCE and conspiracy context, the question of cumulative punishment186 turns on whether collateral consequences will flow from retaining convictions for the lesserincluded offense when a court convicts and sentences for operating a
continuing criminal enterprise.181
§§ 846 and 848."); cf. U.S.S.G., supra note 45, App. C amend. 66 background cmt. ("An adjustment [for the defendant's role in a conspiracy] is not authorized because the offense level of this
guideline [CCE] already reflects an adjustment for [his conspiratorial] role in the offense.").
181. See generally Peter Westen, The Three Faces ofDouble Jeopardy: Reflections on Government Appeals of Criminal Sentences, 78 MICH. L. RE.v. 1001, 1026 (1980). In the context of
crimes involving conspiratorial conduct, the Wharton's Rule preserves the presumption, described by the Supreme Court as "an exception to the general principle that a conspiracy and the
substantive offense that is its immediate end are discrete crimes for which separate sanctions may
be imposed." Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 771 (1975). See supra note 99.
182. Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 156.
183. The courts allowing cumulative punishment have attempted to glean congressional authorization from the structure of the CCE statute. This line of argument suffers from two deficiencies. Initially, this contention contravenes the Supreme Court's reading of the CCE statute
in Jeffers. See Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 155 ("[T]he first issue to be considered is whether Congress
attempted to allow cumulative punishment for violations of§§ 846 and 848. We have concluded
that it did not •..."). Moreover, the perceived structural symmetry of the CCE and drug
conspiracy statutes hardly qualifies as "a clear indication of ... legislative intent" to cumulate
punishment. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 692 (1980).
184. See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864-65 (1985).
185. See supra text accompanying notes 46-51.
186. This Note contends that the imposition of concurrent sentences for conspiracy convictions directly punishes a criininal defendant in violation of the Multiple Punishment Doctrine.
See infra text accompanying notes 207-13.
187. A defendant in the position to challenge conspiracy convictions because of the potential
for collateral consequences will inevitably encounter identical consequences from a CCE conviction. The fact that such negative consequences are "not unique" to the criminal defendant convicted of both CCE and conspiracy was proffered by the Third Circuit in Fernandez as a reason
for concluding that preserving conspiracy convictions does not entail multiple punishment.
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The retention of both conspiracy and CCE convictions generates
four adverse collateral consequences in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. A defendant convicted both of conspiracy and engaging
in a continuing criminal enterprise faces additional social stigma from
each conspiracy conviction. 188 Second, the lesser-included conspiracy
convictions heighten the possibility that a person convicted for CCE
will be impeached in a future legal proceeding. 189 A jury might not
comprehend the significance of the fact that several convictions stem
from the same set of events. 19° Thus, lesser-included conspiracy convictions might provide the basis for impeachment, which could be critical for a defendant in a future proceeding. Third, the retention of
lesser-included conspiracy convictions may subject defendants to recidivist sentencing statutes that enhance punishment based solely on
the number of convictions on their records. 19 1 For instance, a defendant might be convicted for operating a continuing criminal enterprise,
conspiracy to import narcotics, and conspiracy to distribute narcotics.
Though part of one coherent scheme, these convictions would qualify
the defendant as a habitual felon in several states. 192 Finally, the retention of lesser-included conspiracy convictions increases the risk
that a defendant will endure pretrial detention pursuant to a subsequent arrest. 193 These consequences, however remote, exceed the punishment authorized by Congress. 19 4
These adverse collateral consequences also undermine other interests that the Multiple Punishment Doctrine safeguards. 195 A vindictive prosecutor could easily discriminate between criminal defendants
by charging certain defendants with multiple conspiracies, arbitrarily
exposing them to the prospect of punishment greater than other, similarly situated defendants. 196 Additionally, prosecutors may wield the
United States v. Fernandez, 916 F.2d 125, 128 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2249
(1991).
There are two reasons to reject this line of reasoning. First, the concern with adverse collat·
eral consequences remains, because a defendant convicted of greater and lesser offenses is more
likely to face the prospect of collateral sanctions of increased severity. See supra text accompanying notes 56-66. Moreover, the potential for adverse consequences presumably represents part of
the penalty which the legislature intends when labeling certain conduct as criminal. Absent
convincing evidence that the legislature intended those consequences to be multiplied by convictions for portions of the same conduct, however, courts ought to impose punishment for the
greater offense alone. See Ball, 470 U.S. at 864-65; see also infra text accompanying notes 20713.
188. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 56 (1968).
189. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
190. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 791 (1969).
191. See supra text accompanying notes 58-62.
192. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
194. Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864-65 (1985).
195. See supra notes 30-45 and accompanying text.
196. Cf. Note, supra note 25, at 307 ("[T]here is evidence that defendants who have gained
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possibility of multiple conspiracy convictions to coerce individual defendants into plea arrangements arbitrarily. 197
Permitting a defendant to be convicted, sentenced, or both for conspiracy in addition to CCE penetrates the constitutional barrier erected between the legislative and judicial branches of government.
Absent specific authorization from the legislature to cumulate punishments, allowing convictions for lesser offenses to stand goes beyond
the scope of judicial power because those convictions invariably constitute punishment in excess of the legislatively enacted statutory
scheme. 198
Thus, the Supreme Court's test for evaluating multiple punishment
claims and the constitutional values underlying the prohibition on cumulative punishment both suggest that conviction and sentencing for
conspiracy in addition to CCE is inconsistent with the Multiple Punishment Doctrine. The next section examines the constitutionality of
permitting a defendant convicted and sentenced for engaging in a CCE
to be concurrently sentenced for conspiring to violate the narcotics
laws.

B. Unconstitutionality of Retaining Concurrent Convictions or
Sentences: The Third and Seventh Circuit Approaches

The conclusion that the Multiple Punishment Doctrine forbids cumulative sentencing for CCE and conspiracy implies that the Third
and Seventh Circuits' approaches undermine the prohibition on multiple punishments. Thus, the reasons offered by the Third Circuit for
retaining conspiracy convictions, while vacating sentences received for
those counts, merit consideration. 199 The Third Circuit, in United
States v. Fernandez, justified the retention of conspiracy convictions by
arguing that "[t]here is simply no indication ... that Congress did not
intend to permit separate convictions to stand for the conspiracy and
notoriety and those who have offended the police are frequently selected for multiple punishment.") (footnotes omitted).
197. See supra text accompanying note 33. A prosecutor may apply these incentives most
effectively against persons entering the criminal justice system for the first time and facing both
CCE and conspiracy charges. If the conspiracy charges do not count against the defendant, the
person can rationally weigh the chances of conviction against the known consequences of conviction, since the range of punishment would be confined to the CCE statute. However, a defendant
facing unknown criminal sanctions from multiple conspiracy convictions might find the incentive
to waive the exercise of his or her constitutional rights irresistible. Cf. Note, supra note 25, at
305 & n.188.
198. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text; cf. Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137,
157 (1977) ("[The court] had no power, however, to impose on [Jeffers] a fine greater than the
maximum permitted by § 848.").
199. But cf. Yanik, supra note 11, at 519 (praising Third Circuit for "enunciat[ing] the rule
that if there exists one general sentence, the length of which is limited by the statutory maximum
allowable under the more serious offense, then there is no perversion of the double jeopardy
concept").
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continuing criminal enterprise offenses."200 This conclusion both perverts the government's constitutionally mandated burden to establish
congressional authorization to cumulate punishments and ignores Jeffers' reading of the CCE statutory scheme. Established precedent requires evidence that Congress affirmatively intended to punish
cumulatively; 201 Jeffers explicitly concluded that Congress has not expressed the requisite intent in this arena. 202 Moreover, attempts to
justify the retention of conspiracy convictions as a device for the continued incarceration of CCE offenders in the event of appellate reversal of CCE convictions203 do not alter the constitutional equation.
Although the Court has recognized a state's interest in ensuring punishment of criminals for their offenses, 204 it has refused to "weigh" the
values derived from the Double Jeopardy Clause. "[W]here the
Double Jeopardy Clause is applicable, its sweep is absolute. There are
no 'equities' to be balanced, for the Clause has declared a constitutional policy, based on grounds that are not open to judicial examination. "205 The Third Circuit's approach should not be condoned given
the risk of excessive punishment inherent in the retention of separate
convictions for the two offenses. 206
The conclusion that retaining conspiracy convictions in addition to
a CCE conviction violates the Multiple Punishment Doctrine also renders the Seventh Circuit's approach - permitting both simultaneous
convictions and concurrent sentences - constitutionally suspect. The
Seventh Circuit aggravates the constitutional violation by permitting
the imposition of concurrent sentences for conspiracy convictions. In
United States v. Bond, 201 the court justified concurrent sentences by
arguing that "Jeffers does not govern [as long as] the total punishment
imposed by the district court is less than the maximum allowed by the
CCE Act." 208 Under this reasoning, no multiple punishment problem
200. United States v. Fernandez, 916 F.2d at 125, 127 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
2249 (1991).
201. See, e.g., Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684 (1980). The inquiry into congressional
authorization is stated in terms of a rebuttable presumption in favor of lenity. "Accordingly,
where two statutory provisions proscribe the 'same offense,' they are construed not to authorize
cumulative punishments in the absence of a clear indication of contrary legislative intent." 445
U.S. at 692.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 89-91; supra notes 173-83.
203. Fernandez, 916 F.2d at 127-28.
204. E.g., United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 92 (1978) (a defendant's interest in finality
weighs "against the public interest in insuring that justice is meted out to offenders"); Burks v.
United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15 (1978) ("society maintains a valid concern for insuring that the
guilty are punished"); see also Doss, supra note 37, at 1429 ("The state has an interest in insuring
that proper punishment is imposed for a particular offense and defendant.").
205. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. at 11 n.6.
206. See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 865 (1985) ("Thus, the second conviction, even
if it results in no greater sentence, is an impermissible punishment.").
207. 847 F.2d 1233 (7th Cir. 1988).
208. 847 F.2d at 1239.
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occurs if the sentencing court imposes concurrent sentences on the
conspiracy counts for periods shorter than the sentence imposed for
CCE. The Jeffers Court did not approve concurrent sentences but simply declined to address the issue as not ripe for adjudication. 209 The
Jeffers Court simply did not address the issue of concurrent sentences
because the defendant was sentenced to life in prison without parole. 210 Instead, Jeffers presumed that conspiracy falls within the statutory definition of a CCE. 211 The extensive discussion of adverse
collateral consequences in Ball v. United States 212 eclipses the weak
support that the Seventh Circuit's position purports to derive from
Jeffers. 213
The Supreme Court's pronouncements regarding the Multiple
Punishment Doctrine mandate dismissing the Third and Seventh Circuit approaches. The combination approach and the majority vacation approach require greater scrutiny, however, as they appear
facially to avoid constitutional infirmity.

209. The Jeffers Court's refusal to vacate the defendant's concurrent conspiracy sentence
does not undermine the conclusion that Congress did not intend to cumulate punishments. The
Court correctly noted that the issue of multiple punishment for concurrent prison terms was not
presented, since Jeffers had been sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.
Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 155 n.24 (1977). The Court simply argued that Jeffers
would not suffer any additional punishment from the concurrent sentence. Because Jeffers would
never be released, and because the existence of adverse collateral consequences presumes that the
defendant might be made to suffer in a later criminal proceeding, Ball, 470 U.S. at 864-65, the
issue was not in question.
The Seventh Circuit's reading of Jeffers in Bond, 847 F.2d at 1238-39, is less persuasive than
the interpretation offered by other circuit courts of appeals. While the Double Jeopardy Clause
does not forbid sentencing a defendant for both CCE and conspiracy in situations resembling
Jeffers (when the defendant has been sentenced to life without possibility of parole), the imposition of multiple sentences will normally entail collateral consequences prohibited by the Multiple
Punishment Doctrine. See supra text accompanying notes 188-99.
210. See Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 155 n.24 ("[S]ince [Jeffers] is not eligible for parole at any time,
there is no need to examine the Government's argument that the prison sentences do not present
any possibility of cumulative punishment."); see also Restrepo v. United States, 761 F. Supp. 211,
215 (D. Mass. 1991) ("Bond is not persuasive because it appears to be founded upon a misapprehension of the holding in Jeffers."). The panel in Bond also read Garrett to mean that "the
Double Jeopardy Clause does not of its own force bar separate convictions for the CCE offense
and its predicate felonies." 847 F.2d at 1239. The Garrett Court, however, took pains to distinguish between its holding that cumulative punishment is permissible for predicate substantive
offenses and the decision in Jeffers that conspiracies are lesser-included offenses within CCE. See
Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 794-95 (1985).
211. See Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 150 ("So construed, [conspiracy] is a lesser-included offense of
[CCE], because § 848 requires proof of every fact necessary to show a [conspiracy] as well as
proof of several additional elements.").
212. 470 U.S. 856, 864-65 (1985); see also supra text accompanying notes 50-52.
213. The Bond court asserted that allowing concurrent convictions and sentences for conspiracy entails "no risk of collateral consequences," because parole is not available to those found
guilty of operating a continuing criminal enterprise. 847 F.2d at 1239. The court simply failed
to account for the other types of adverse collateral consequences identified in Ball. See supra text
accompanying notes 188-98.
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C. Comparison of the Combination and Majority Approaches
Advocates argue that both the vacation and combination methods
avoid adverse collateral consequences.214 The vacation approach ensures that courts will never use conspiracy convictions as the basis for
future sanctions against a defendant because the convictions disappear
from the defendant's record. The combination approach arguably
achieves the same result by merging the two convictions into one,
while retaining the capacity to revive the conspiracy conviction upon
reversal of the CCE conviction.21s
Two courts have explicitly rejected the combination approach, justifying their decisions on the basis that the potential for collateral consequences remains. 216 Neither court, however, addressed the reasons
underlying their conclusion. 217 Careful consideration reveals two
ways in which the combination approach may infringe on the protections guaranteed by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Initially, the combination approach cannot guarantee that no adverse collateral
consequences will follow from the merger of the convictions because
the presence of the conspiracy convictions on a defendant's record invites their use against the defendant in a later sentencing or at a future
trial. Conspiracy convictions are not "merged out of existence"218
under the combination approach; less sophisticated jurisdictions may
misperceive a defendant's record and count the conspiracy and CCE
convictions independently in calculating a recidivist sentence. Thus,
despite protestations to the contrary, 219 a defendant in a combination
214. See supra text accompanying notes 129-34; supra note 142 and accompanying text.
215. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
216. See United States v. Rivera-Martinez, 931 F.2d 148, 153 (1st Cir.), cerL denied, 112 S.
Ct. 184 (1991) ("Ifwe were to embrace the minority viewpoint and allow the conspiracy conviction to stand on the theory that no additional punishment flowed from it, we would needlessly
erode the prophlylaxis afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause."); Restrepo v. United States, 761
F. Supp. 211, 217 (D. Mass. 1991) ("While the Second Circuit approach may indeed be sufficient
to satisfy Ball, [there is] no basis for striking out in such new territory when the Supreme Court
has spoken so clearly on the matter.").
217. E.g., Rivera-Martinez. 931 F.2d at 153 ("Even a guilty defendant has constitutional
rights. The Double Jeopardy Clause protects those rights. It requires that the section 846 conviction be erased from the docket.").
218. United States v. Osorio Estrada, 751 F.2d 128, 135 (2d Cir. 1984), modified on other
grounds, 151 F.2d 27 (2d Cir.), and cerL denied, 474 U.S. 830 (1985).
219. See, e.g., United States v. Aiello, 771 F.2d 621, 633-34 (2d Cir. 1985) ("A combined
lesser conviction could not properly be considered, for instance, in determining a defendant's
eligibility for parole, in sentencing him in the future under a recidivist statute or in impeaching
his credibility at a later trial."). The difficulty with this argument is that counting convictions for
recidivist sentencing or impeachment purposes is often governed by state law under traditional
notions of comity. See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2607 (1991) ("Under our constitutional system, the primary responsibility for defining crimes against state law, fixing punishments
for the commission of these crimes, and establishing procedures for criminal trials rests with the
States."); see also Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 790-91 (1969) (noting that adverse collateral consequences can be generated by state law). Thus, the well-intentioned efforts of the combination approach may be undermined by the crude tools of state law. See supra notes 55-66 and
accompanying text.
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jurisdiction may encounter adverse collateral consequences. This risk
also exists in the combination approach because of the ontological difficulty in understanding what "combining" convictions entails.220
While this risk cannot be quantified, this Note contends that any risk
of adverse collateral consequences merits the rejection of the combination approach. 221 The Multiple Punishment Doctrine mandates that a
defendant never be subjected to punishment for a lesser-included offense. 222 The combination approach cannot guarantee that result.
The risk of additional punishment exists so long as the convictions
appear on the defendant's criminal record. 223
Moreover, the combination approach entails the risk that a trial
court will improperly consider the defendant's conspiracy convictions
in the sentencing process. This risk takes three forms. First, a trial
court may improperly calculate a defendant's sentence under the sentencing guidelines by assuming that the conspiracy convictions justify
additional punishment and impose additional sentencing points upon a
defendant for his or her "role in the offense."224 The additional points
for conspiracy punish excessively because the penalty for concerted
action is already reflected in the CCE sentence.22s Additionally, a trial
judge may - consciously or unconsciously - rely on conspiracy convictions in establishing the defendant's base offense level.226 The sen220. See Osorio Estrada, 751 F.2d at 135 (Kearse, J., concurring); see also Thomas, supra
note 11, at 1388 ("It is not clear just what is meant by 'combining' convictions.").
221. See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864-65 (1985); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.
784, 790-91 (1969); Restrepo v. United States, 761 F. Supp. 211, 217 (D. Mass. 1991) ("While
the Second Circuit's approach may indeed be sufficient to satisfy Ball, [there is] no basis for
striking out in such new territocy when the Supreme Court has spoken so clearly on the
matter.").
222. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 (1977) ("[T]he Fifth Amendment forbids .•. cumulative punishment for a greater and lesser-included olfense.").
223. See Ball, 470 U.S. at 865 ("[TJhe presence of two convictions on the [defendant's] record
may ... result in an increased sentence under a recidivist statute for a future olfense.") (emphasis
added); cf. Thomas, supra note 11, at 1388 ("Creating quasi-convictions capable of springing into
existence in the future is, however, a rather unusual solution to the multiple penalty problem.").
224. See United States v. Nixon, 918 F.2d 895, 908 (11th Cir. 1990) ("[Vacation of conspiracy convictions] is especially indicated here, where the trial judge's reliance in sentencing on the
lesser conspiracy count allowed a three to four level increase that is prohibited for the greater
CCE count."). The guidelines generally allow for a four-level increase in the base olfense level
"[i]f the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more
participants." U.S.S.G., supra note 45, § 3Bl.l(a). Such conduct is part of the statutocy definition of a CCE, so a "role in the olfense" increase is prohibited for conspiratorial conduct in a
continuing criminal enterprise.
225. The sentencing guidelines prohibit enhancement of olfense levels for a defendant's role
in a CCE olfense. See U.S.S.G., supra note 45, App. C amend. 66 background cmt. ("An adjustment ... is not authorized because the olfense level [for CCE] already reflects an adjustment for
role in the olfense.").
226. See United States v. Bafia, 949 F.2d 1465, 1474 (7th Cir. 1991) ("the district court
grouped the conspiracy and CCE convictions into one categoi:y and then applied the Guidelines"), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 1989 (1992); cf. United States v. Cloutier, 966 F.2d 24, 27 (1st Cir.
1992) ("the court ... grouped the two counts together under U.S.S.G. § 3Dl.2(d) and applied
the olfense guideline that produced the higher olfense level").
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tence then reflects an aggregation of convictions impermissible under
the Multiple Punishment Doctrine. Finally, a trial court might rely
on a defendant's conspiracy conviction in setting the defendant's sentence within the range permissible under the sentencing guidelines. 227
While the Sentencing Commission has set rigid schedules for determining sentences, the trial judge retains discretion to fix a defendant's
sentence within the range prescribed by the guidelines. 228 The combination approach thus generates the risk that the sentencing judge will
impose a sentence toward the upper end of the range because of the
conspiracy convictions. The risk of these sentencing errors arises because the combination approach implicitly regards conspiracy convictions as conduct independently warranting punishment.229
Even assuming that the combination method effectively eliminates
the possibility for adverse collateral consequences, the approach fails
on policy grounds. Proponents have marshaled two policy arguments
in favor of merging conspiracy convictions into the CCE conviction.
Initially, the Second Circuit maintains that combining the convictions
ensures that a defendant does not escape punishment in the event that
his CCE conviction is overturned on appeal. 230 In other words, the
conspiracy convictions should be retained - albeit denied effect - as
a basis for continued incarceration to further both penological objectives and public safety.
The continued incarceration argument is unpersuasive, however.
State and federal appellate courts have long enjoyed the power to impose a conviction for a lesser-included offense upon reversal of a
greater offense. 23 1 Courts justify this power, the constitutionality of
which "has never seriously been questioned," 232 on two grounds.
227. See United States v. Alvarez, 860 F.2d 801, 830 (7th Cir. 1988) ("[T]here remains the
distinct possibility that the district court may have considered [the defendant's] guilt on the
conspiracy conviction in sentencing him on the CCE conviction.''), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1051
(1989).
228. See U.S.S.G., supra note 45, § 2Al ("Pursuant to the [Sentencing Reform] Act, the
sentencing court must select a sentence from within the guideline range. If, however, a particular
case presents atypical features, the Act allows the court to depart from the guidelines and sentence outside the prescribed range.").
229. See, e.g., United States v. Osorio Estrada, 751 F.2d 128, 135 (2d Cir. 1984) (the conspiracy convictions are not "merged out of existence •.•. [and) the part of the conviction on the
lesser offense [remains] unaffected should the compound offense be invalidated as a matter of
law"), modified on other grounds, 757 F.2d 27 (2d Cir.), and cert. denied, 474 U.S. 830 (1985).
230. See, e.g., United States v. Aiello, 771 F.2d 621, 634 (2d Cir. 1985) ("[T]he reactivation
of the lesser conviction facilitates the congressional purpose of ensuring that a defendant is punished for whatever degree of a crime he is adjudged to be guilty of having committed.''); see also
United States v. Blackston, 547 F. Supp. 1200, 1209-10 (S.D. Ga. 1982), modified sub nom.
United States v. Brantley, 733 F.2d 1429 (11th Cir. 1984), and cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1006 (1985).
231. See 3 WAYNER. LAFAVE &JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE§ 24.4(b)-(c)
(1984 & Supp. 1991); see also Morris v. Mathews, 475 U.S. 237 (1986) (affirming a state appellate
court's imposition of a conviction for a lesser-included offense).
232. Dickenson v. Israel, 482 F. Supp. 1223, 1225 (E.D. Wis. 1980), a.ffd., 644 F.2d 308 (7th
Cir. 1981).
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First, courts possess the power under the common law to direct that a
conviction for the lesser offense be entered since "[a] jury's finding of
guilt on all elements of the greater offense is necessarily a finding of
guilt on all elements of the lesser offense."233 Moreover, the federal
judiciary can invoke the appellate courts' statutory authority to "modify . . . any judgment . . . and direct the entry of such appropriate
judgment ... as may be just under the circumstances. " 234 The combination approach, therefore, offers no advantage over the majority approach in this regard. 235 Both methods guarantee the continued
incarceration of potentially dangerous felons.
In addition, the Second Circuit's fear that persons convicted of engaging in a criminal enterprise will escape punishment absent the combination approach is unjustified. First, if an appellate court reverses a
CCE conviction because of evidentiary insufficiency, the inadequate
proof will likely impugn a defendant's conspiracy convictions as well
because conspiracy is an element of CCE. 236 The same logic applies to
reversals for constitutional error - conspiracy and CCE convictions
are often obtained pursuant to identical enforcement practices, 237 so
both convictions are likely to suffer from the same constitutional infirmity. 238 If the error does not infect the evidence of a conspiracy, the
government is free to prosecute the defendant for that crime without
233. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Josiah, 641 F.2d 1103, 1108 (3d Cir. 1981); see also
United States v. Plenty Arrows, 946 F.2d 62, 66-67 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Dickinson,
706 F.2d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Lamartina, 584 F.2d 764, 766-67 (6th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 928 (1979); United States v. Homing, 409 F.2d 424, 426 (4th Cir. 1969).
234. 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1988). For cases invoking this statutory authority to justify the imposition of a conviction on a lesser offense, see Tinder v. United States, 345 U.S. 565, 570 (1953);
United States v. Cobb, 558 F.2d 486, 489 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Industrial Lab. Co.,
456 F.2d 908, 911 (10th Cir. 1972); Allison v. United States, 409 F.2d 445, 450-51 (D.C. Cir.
1969).
235. Professor Thomas argues that "[a]llowing multiple convictions for the same offense to
stand in case some of the convictions are reversed on appeal .•. permits the state to hedge its bets
in a way that violates the underlying purpose of the multiple punishment doctrine." Thomas,
supra note 11, at 1384 (footnote omitted).
236. See United States v. Ordonez, 737 F.2d 793, 805-06 (9th Cir. 1983) (reversing convictions for CCE and conspiracy because of evidence admitted in violation of the federal rules).
237. See supra text accompanying notes 13-14 (government normally indicts defendants for
both offenses).
238. The Second Circuit has conceded this probability. See United States v. Aiello, 771 F.2d
621, 634 n.8 (2d Cir. 1985) ("Naturally, the lesser conviction would only reactivate if the error
that produced the reversal of the conviction on the greater offense was not one that also tainted
the conviction on the lesser offense."). The combination approach thus appears to require excessive appeals. If a CCE conviction is reversed due to error, the appellate court must remand to
the trial court for resentencing. The defendant must again appeal to contest the conviction and
sentence for conspiracy, even if the conviction is challenged on the same grounds as the CCE
conviction. See infra text accompanying notes 244-48.
Moreover, a defendant obtaining a reversal of his CCE conviction can generally be retried.
See infra text accompanying note 245. Hence, vacating conspiracy convictions does not "immunize[] [a defendant] from retrial." United States v. Blackston, 547 F. Supp. 1200, 1209 (S.D. Ga.
1982), modified sub nom. United States v. Brauntley, 733 F.2d 1249 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1006 (1985). The Second Circuit has also acknowledged this scenario. See Aiello,
771 F.2d at 634 ("If the government were able to retry the defendant on the greater charge and
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offending the Double Jeopardy Clause.239
The Ninth Circuit suggests a second policy advantage for the combination approach - the conservation of scarce judicial resources.
The Ninth Circuit reasons that the combination method avoids the
need to remand a case to vacate conspiracy convictions because, upon
affirmance of the CCE conviction, "the vacation will have been accomplished automatically."240 But this argument's appeal fades upon inspection. Initially, the majority approach also avoids unnecessary
remands because the trial court must vacate the conspiracy convictions at sentencing. 241 Additionally, a CCE conviction will never be
"affirmed" in the sense contemplated by the Ninth Circuit. A conviction is normally subject to habeas corpus review, 242 so the conspiracy
convictions must remain in effect until the defendant completes the
maximum possible sentence for conspiracy if the combination method
is to achieve the desired result. Thus, conspiracy convictions will
never be vacated "automatically"; they must be vacated by the trial
court in order to be purged from a defendant's record.243
The majority approach better avoids taxing judicial resources.
· Under the combination approach, a defendant can initially appeal only
the conviction and sentence for the CCE count because "the judgment
on the lesser-included offense is not final until sentencing. " 244 The
combination approach then permits the conspiracy conviction to be
chose to do so, any conviction on the greater would again replace the conviction on the lesser

....").

239. See United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964) (double jeopardy not implicated when
the government retries a defendant following the reversal of a conviction).
240. United States v. Medina, 940 F.2d 1247, 1253 (9th Cir. 1991).
241. See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864 (1985) ("[T]he only remedy consistent with
congressional intent is for the District Court, where the sentencing responsibility resides, to exercise its discretion to vacate one of the underlying convictions.").
242. "A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claim·
ing the right ..• that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law ••. may
move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence .••• at
any time." 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988). But cf. Gomez v. United States Dist. Court, 112 S. Ct.
1652, 1653 (1992) (per curiam) (denying habeas motion because of "abusive delay").
243. The Second Circuit admits that "the convictions on the lesser counts ..• would not be
merged out of existence." United States v. Osorio Estrada, 751 F.2d 128, 135 (2d Cir. 1984),
modified on other grounds, 451 F.2d 27 (2d Cir.), and cert. denied, 474 U.S. 830 (1985). The
merger doctrine generally requires a trial court to vacate convictions obtained for lesser-included
offenses because they are said to "merge" into the conviction for the greater offense. See supra
note 113.
244. United States v. Stallings, 810 F.2d 973, 976 (10th Cir. 1987). The Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure provide that "[i]n a criminal case the notice of appeal by a defendant shall
be filed in the district court within 10 days after the entry of .•. the judgment." FED. R. APP. P.
4(b). A judgment must include both the verdict and a sentence. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(l) ("A
judgment of conviction shall set forth the plea, the verdict or findings, and the adjudication and
sentence.") (emphasis added); cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(2) ("After imposing sentence in a case
which has gone to trial on a plea of not guilty, the court shall advise the defendant of the defend·
ant's right to appeal ..•.") (emphasis added). Thus, a defendant cannot appeal a "combined"
conspiracy conviction until sentence has been imposed, which necessitates two sets of appeals in
a combination approach jurisdiction.
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revived if the appellate court reverses the CCE conviction. The case
would be remanded to the trial court for sentencing on the defendant's
conspiracy counts.245 Only after sentencing could the defendant appeal the conspiracy conviction.246 Thus, "[t]he minority position may
result in two appeals from the same trial." 247 The majority approach
avoids this possibility because the appellate court will necessarily review the propriety of the conspiracy conviction when deciding to exercise the authority to impose convictions for the lesser-included
offenses. 248
The compatibility of the majority rule with traditional excessive
punishment doctrine provides a compelling argument in its favor.
Since the CCE statute requires proof of conspiratorial conduct, 249 and
Congress has not explicitly authorized cumulative punishment,250
courts should vacate conspiracy convictions. 251 The vacation approach also realizes the values underlying the Multiple Punishment
Doctrine. For example, the majority rule eliminates the possibility of
adverse consequences flowing from separate convictions for CCE and
conspiracy, a critical factor in the Supreme Court's multiple punishment analysis. 252 A defendant faces no danger of future collateral consequences under the majority approach, which purges the invalid
convictions from the defendant's record. 253
CONCLUSION
The Double Jeopardy Clause is among the most powerful and important aspects of the Bill of Rights. The Multiple Punishment Doctrine, derived from the Clause, is designed to further several goals,
including limiting the potential for prosecutorial abuse, preserving the
separation of powers, and preserving a criminal defendant's interest in
finality. Permitting courts to impose conspiracy convictions for behavior identical to that deemed necessary by Congress to establish the
separate offense of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise poses a
unique challenge to the prohibition on cumulative punishment. Retaining conspiracy convictions imposes excessive punishment on the
criminal defendant because such convictions risk consequences ad245. United States v. Aiello, 771 F.2d 621, 634 n.8 (2d Cir. 1985).
246. Stallings, 810 F.2d at 976.
247. 810 F.2d at 976.
248. See United States v. Plenty Arrows, 946 F.2d 62, 66-67 (8th Cir. 1991); Government of
the Virgin Islands v. Josiah, 641 F.2d 1103, 1108-09 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Lamartina,
584 F.2d 764, 766-67 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 928 (1979); Allison v. United States,
409 F.2d 445, 450-52 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (all reviewing evidence in favor oflesser-included offense).
249. See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 173-83 and accompanying text.
251. See supra text accompanying note 69.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 46-52.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 214-15.
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verse to the defendant beyond those intended by Congress. Eliminating conspiracy convictions from a defendant's criminal record is the
only constitutionally sufficient response to the multiple punishment
problem in the continuing criminal enterprise context.
The majority approach, mandating the vacation of lesser-included
conspiracy convictions when a court simultaneously convicts a defendant of operating a continuing criminal enterprise, best addresses the
risk of cumulative punishment through adverse collateral consequences. Even assuming that the combination method could avoid
collateral consequences, the policy advantages proffered by the circuits
adhering to the combination approach do not justify experimentation
given the Supreme Court's clear expression in Ball v. United States of
the constitutional need to vacate lesser-included convictions. Indeed,
the vacation approach also prevails on policy grounds. The majority
approach permits the judiciary to ensure that defendants will remain
incarcerated if the court reverses their CCE conviction, and the vacation of convictions best conserves scarce judicial resources by avoiding
two sets of appeals from the same trial.

